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THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY FOR DAM-




Compensation for damages caused by aircraft to persons and
property on the surface of the earth constitutes one of the most
important and difficult problems in the field of air law. Aviators
are forced to fly over towns and fields in the course of flight, and,
at any moment, may unwillingly cause damage by the falling of
their aircraft or of objects therefrom, or by a forced landing on
private or public property outside an airport.
Injuries thus caused may, in principle, be very important.
If we admit that, for the protection of persons on the ground,
there must be instituted a very severe rule of liability-not allow-
ing any defense on the part of the aviator and with no considera-
tion of the causes of the damage; and if we admit, on the other
hand, that compensation resulting from such liability should not be
limited to a small sum, the result is that aviators are constantly
running the risk of being financially ruined as the result of any one
air accident. However, if we put ourselves in the position of the
persons on the ground, who generally have no means of avoiding
any damage caused by an aircraft and can not even determine the
cause of the accident, we see that the application of the droit
commun in this case would be very unjust and even inadmissible
for the greater part of the people who as yet derive no benefit
from air navigation.
*The following article was written in French for THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
with the understanding that it would be translated at the AIR LAW INSTITUTE.
The translation has been made by Katherine Fritts, Secretary-Librarian of the
Institute.
tAvocat &. la Cour d'Appel de Varsovie.
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It is true that this conflict of interests between aviators and
persons on the ground exists only in theory. Actually, the situa-
tion is not nearly so difficult because generally the damage caused
on land by aircraft is of little importance. The aircraft must
fall on real property. Even so, the accident alone does not cause
very serious damage. The greatest danger is from fire. But
most laws forbid unnecessary flight over cities and, in any case,
require that an altitude of sufficient height be maintained, in order
to avoid a forced landing in a town. Furthermore, measures are
taken to avoid fire on land, as, for example, the immediate empty-
ing of gasoline tanks, etc. Thus, as may be shown by statistics,
serious damage caused by aircraft on the surface fortunately pre-
sents only a very rare exception.
Consequently, the conflict of interests between aviators and
persons on the ground is less sharp and frequent in practice than
in theory. However, the problem of compensation for damage
caused on' the surface of the earth does not lose its importance.
Every state is interested. But some believe it too soon to make spe-
cial rules for air liability; they think it better, in spite of certain
disadvantages, to apply the rules of the droit commun instead of
adopting special rules which, for lack of sufficient experience, might
bring about undesirable results or even give rise to conflicts in the
legal system of the country. Other states, the greater number of
which have a highly developed air navigation system, consider it
necessary to make special regulations for the liability of aviators
toward third persons on the surface of the earth.
Some aircraft accidents, which happened before or immedi-
ately after the world war, made an unfavorable impression upon
the public mind. It was concluded that aircraft were of' great
danger to persons on the ground, because the aircraft were then
far from perfection in development and very often, for unknown
reasons, got out of control of the pilot. People saw in aviation a
new and inexplicable phenomenon-something to be feared. They
imagined that any aircraft accident would cause serious damage
on the ground, damage which it was impossible to avoid. Like-
wise they believed this danger to be much greater than that to
which they were exposed with motor traffic. Jurists had not
then tried to change this point of view. Through the use of sta-
tistics and documents, they exaggerated the degree and frequency
of danger which an aircraft presents to persons on the ground,
and found it necessary to provide substantial compensation for
damage, without considering the interests of the aviator. They
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did not limit themselves to making it easier for the injured party
to get compensation, by freeing him from the burden of proof,
but they further decided that, without limiting in any way the
amount of damages, the damages must be paid by the aviator-
no matter what the cause of the accident, even though it be through
force majeure. Thus, most of the early legislation evidenced a
belief that absolute liability of the aviator, without any limitation,
was advisable.
In time, air navigation changed. Aircraft ceased to be con-
sidered new and unknown. It was discovered that, in spite of the
constant growth in number of aircraft, accidents were fewer and,
above all, injuries caused on the surface of the earth were rare
and generally of little importance. Furthermore, the jurists began
to show a change of opinion. Thus, as we shall see in the first
part of this study, certain recent laws have found it impossible to
place upon the aviator the burden of absolute and unlimited lia-
bility. For example, Poland1 and Mexico 2 have been content to
establish a presumption of liability against the aviator-giving
him the right to prove lack of fault on his part. In Poland, the
particular liability of air law has been conceived in a manner less
severe than that of the droit commun. In Italy the law of August
20, 1923, now in force, instituted less severe liability than the
aeronautical law of November 27, 1919, preceding. In the United
States, the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, which maintains
absolute liability, had been favorably received from the very be-
ginning. From 1923 to 1929, a number of States and territories
adopted it. However, since 1929 no State has adopted it and
even one of those who adopted it in 1925 has repealed it.a
Evidently, as we shall see by the following, the greater num-
ber of these states who have dealt with liability. toward third per-
sons in their air laws, have adopted the principle of absolute
liability. In twenty-one aeronautical laws which at this time regu-
late our problem throughout the world, eleven have adopted the
principle of absolute and unlimited liability in all cases, two apply
this liability rule only to damage caused outside of authorized
airports, and one law limits the amount of the damages. Further-
more, two laws adopt different principles of liability according
to the nature of the injury (that of absolute liability, among
others). Lastly, five laws completely reject the principle of absolute
liability. Moreover, certain laws place under the head of the
1. Decree of March 14. 1928.
2. Law of August 31. 1931.
3. Idaho.
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special regulation of air law all damage caused by aircraft; others
limit themselves only to damage caused by accidents. This lia-
bility generally concerns all aircraft, but sometimes it concerns
only aircraft propelled by motor and does not apply to balloons
and gliders. Finally, seven laws, in order to safeguard and pro-
tect the interests of the injured party against the insolvency of
the aviator who is liable, demand that the latter guarantee pay-
ment of damages which he can be required to pay. Generally, this
guaranty must take the form of insurance or the deposit of money
or securities. But the laws do not agree regarding the form and
amount of this guaranty.
We can see now what differences there are among the air
laws of various countries. But this condition is very detrimental
to the progress of air navigation. At the present time, aircraft
are traveling at a very high and constantly increasing rate of
speed, which speed has already surpassed that of other means of
transportation. Furthermore, aircraft are not limited by the con-
tour of the land, nor by a route laid out beforehand; also they
can take the shortest way, by flying in a straight line from the
point of take-off to the point of landing. Thanks to aircraft, two
cities are linked much more rapidly than by railroad, automobile,
or boat. This saving in time is especially appreciated over great
distances and it is there that the aircraft-heavier- or lighter-than-
air-is irreplaceable.
Due to the speed of aircraft, their radius of action is con-
stantly growing. Thus in Europe, divided as it is into many coun-
tries of which the largest is not very great, the aircraft is of in-
terest only on international lines. Furthermore, continental lines
are no longer sufficient; aviation and air lines which unite conti-
nents are becoming daily more numerous. Europe-Asia, Europe-
Africa, Europe-Australia, Europe-South America, are regular com-
mercially operated lines. In America, in spite of the great size of
some countries, particularly the United States, commercial aviation
is not content to operate only in the confines of one country, but
air lines uniting North and South America are operating daily.
We see, then, aircraft of large air navigation companies fly-
ing every day over. many countries each of which is regulated by a
different law. Th6 same accident, the same damage caused on the
surface would have varying results according to the country where
it occurred. One country might force the aircraft operator to pay
an enormous amount of damages where another might exact only
a modest sum, and a third might allow him complete exemption
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from liability. Moreover, the defense against any suit might be
entirely different between countries. To provide for and if pos-
sible to cover risks, the air transport operator would require a
number of legal advisers constantly studying the laws, decisions,
decrees and ordinances of all countries to be flown over. This
fact alone makes such flying impracticable for sportsmen and air
tourists who cannot have sufficient legal assistance. All these diffi-
culties are dealt with in aeronautical laws, but it is in the field of
liability toward third persons that the aviator suffers most. For
this reason, uniformity of laws concerning liability for damage
caused on the surface is imperative.
The work of the jurists who have devoted themselves to it
has been very difficult. In the first place it has been necessary
to establish the principle on which liability would be based. Al-
though the great majority of aviation laws have adopted absolute
liability, nevertheless a certain number have preferred to main-
tain a presumption of liability. Furthermore, it is necessary to
consider those nations which, not having made any regulations
regarding this problem, have applied the droit commun to its
solution, i. e., the principle of fault. However, there are two
facts beyond doubt: (1) the injured parties must be granted cer-
tain means of obtaining compensation, because if they are forced,
as is seen generally in the droit commun of most of the countries,
to bring proof of fault on the part of the aviator, that would
mean denial for them of all compensation, since an injured per-
son generally cannot establish the cause of an air accident; (2) it
would be inadmissible to charge the aviator with absolute, un-
limited liability with respect to the amount of the damages.
Two solutions present themselves to the jurists: (1) either
to adopt a presumption of liability against the aviator, by granting
him the right to use one or another means of proof, such as
force majeure; or (2) to adopt the principle of absolute liability,
while limiting the indemnity.
The first solution, which approaches most nearly the droit
comrnun of all countries and which appears the most logical, has
however, the great disadvantage of placing upon the injured per-
son the burden of the injury caused by force majeure. Further-
more, inasmuch as limitation of indemnity could not logically be
concluded from this system, a guaranty of payment of indemnity,
under such a form as this, could not be practically possible.
The second solution does not have these disadvantages. Abso-
lute liability limited to a fixed amount could be combined with a
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guaranty, especially with compulsory insurance against risks, since
the establishment of an insured sum would not offer any diffi-
culty. The result would then be that the injured party would al-
ways receive compensation, whatever the cause of the accident.
The aviator would have nothing to pay since the insurance com-
pany would assume the responsibility of paying the indemnity.
This last solution was adopted by the member jurists of the
C. I. T. E. J. A., charged with the duty of drawing up the project
of the convention-the object of which was to make uniform the
laws of the different countries in regard to liability toward third
parties. With some final corrections, this principle was also ac-
cepted by the Rome Conference of May 15-29, 1933.
Nevertheless, it is not enough to adopt a uniform principle for
liability; it is also necessary to agree on the details, without which
uniformity can not be attained, It is necessary not only to have
uniformity between the different laws of many countries, but also
to eliminate those which, in theory and operation, are opposed to
uniformity. We shall see in the second part of this work what
end is reached in effecting a convention acceptable to all states,
and in successfully unifying all aviation law.
To appreciate fully the work of. the Rome Conference, it is
necessary to understand the aviation laws of the countries which
have taken part. That is why the writer has devoted the first
part of this work to an examination of the regulations concerning
liability toward third persons in aviation law throughout the
world. Various legislative types have been analyzed; as to others,
which differ only in detail, it has been necessary only to point out
the purport of their regulations. For clarity, the national laws
have been set forth, in their alphabetical order, in an additional
comparative table.
The second part of this work is devoted to the explanation,
analysis and criticism of the Rome Convention of May 29, 1933,
which, in spite of its deficiencies and errors, will always be a
great legal document of our era.
NATIONAL LAWS.
Austria Analysis of Types of Legislation.
Aviation is regulated by the law of December 10, 1919, and
the decree of the Minister of Commerce and Communications, of
September 8, 1930, amended by the decree of June 11, 1932.1
4, See FiBohl, Dr. H., Das 8sterreichosche Luftfahrtrecht (Vienna, 1929).
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The decree includes in the definition of aircraft: airships, air-
planes, gliders, free and captive balloons, kites and parachutes.5
Nevertheless, regulations for third-party liability are not the same
for all these types of aircraft.
Relative to damage caused to third persons by motor-driven
aircraft-airships and airplanes, the law of December 10, 1919,6
reverts to the automobile law of August 9, 1908. 7 In regard to
liability of motorless aircraft, the droit commun will apply.
The automobile law as applied to the problem of third-party
liability of motor-driven aircraft has been the result of a com-
promise between the adherents to the absolute liability theory and
those who prefer to maintain the old principle of delictual liability.
Furthermore, the regulations of this law seriously feel the lack of
a clear and definite principle as their basis, and consequently con-
tain certain inaccuracies.
Article 1 of the automobile law contains in its first line the
principle of absolute liability, but Article 2 readily provides a
series of defenses for the person liable.
It is not surprising to note that contributory fault constitutes
the first defense, because, whatever the principle of liability, it
must nevertheless give way before the fault of the person injured
when he is causa efficiens of the injury.'
The second defense allowed by the Austrian law is fault of a
third party. Those persons who are responsible for the operation
of the automobile (or aircraft) are not considered as third persons.
This regulation must be broadly interpreted: the fault of a third
party, even if it is the only cause of the injury, would not exempt
the aircraft owner from his liability in case the fault was com-
mitted by his own employee, even though it occurred outside the
aircraft.9
The terms of Article 2, line 2, of the automobile law raise a
question concerning the fault of a third person. To serve as a
defense, must it be impossible that the aircraft owner can foresee
5. §1.
6. Article 16.
7. Anended, May 3, 1932.
8. In the absence of jurisprudence dealing with damage caused by air-
craft, some cases concerning automobiles will be cited, since In Austria the same
law regulates compensation for damage caused by automobiles as by aircraft.
The motorist is freed from all liability in the case where the injured person
has passed him on the wrong side (Supreme Court, Feb. 22, 1910, Rv. II 64/10),
and, likewise if the injured person, seeing a car approach, crosses the street
in front of it (S. C.. June 21, 1910. Rv. VI .18/10), but actual carelessness
on the part of the injured person does not free the motorist from the duty
of taking all necessary measures of care (S. C., Nov. 19, 1912, Judgment
Records XV 6140).
9. For example, liability is incurred by a transport operator, airport
owner, over whose airport the accident happens, if the accident was caused by
the fault of an employee who had given the wrong signals to the aircraft:
Kilkowski. Die Haftung fOr Luftverkehrsschaden usw. (Marburg, 1930), p. 79.
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and avoid such fault? If any fault of a third person would
exempt the person liable, the conclusion is that the aircraft owner
would not be obliged to give either attention or normal care to
avoid an accident. Even the droit commun (which is less exact-
ing) requires normal care and attention. 10 But to allow the fault
of a third person to be used as a defense only in case the aircraft
owner normally could neither foresee nor prevent it, is to identify
it with force majeure, which the Austrian law apparently had no
intention of doing. However, certain jurists conclude that the
fault of a third person, to serve as a defense, must -normally be
unforeseeable and, especially, inevitable. 1
Evidently, the fault of a third person or of the injured per-
son would not entirely relieve from the responsibility, except in
case it is the only cause of the damage. If it only contributes to
it, the liability of the aircraft owner would be diminished in such
proportion as the judges would deem equitable. The regulation
of §1304, Austrian Civil Code, which holds the injured person
liable for that part of the damage which is in proportion to his
fault, and for half if such proportion is impossible to establish,
would not be applicable. 12
The third and last defense is, however, little understood.
Principally, in order to be freed from liability, the aircraft
owner must prove that the accident could not have been avoided
in spite of all precautions imposed not only by law and regulation
but also by the nature of the circumstances, and that, furthermore,
it had not been caused by any defect, special characteristics, or
fault in operation of the aircraft. We note then that the law
speaks of two sets of facts, joint proof of which can serve as an
excuse. In the first place, the party liable must show proof that
he has taken all necessary precautionary measures, that is, he has
not been at fault, 3 after which he must prove that the injury
could not be due to the special nature of aircraft which would
make it more dangerous for travel than any other means of loco-
motion. In this way the same regulation confuses the principles
of delictual liability and created risk. Evidently, if the damage is
10. §§1297 & 1299, Austrian Civil Code.
11. Bielecki & Rapaport, Ustawa Automobilowa Autrjacka (Krakow, 1911),
p. 38.
12. In case of Joint fault on the part of the motorist and the person
injured by him, the damage could not be apportioned according to §1304 Civ.
C. (droit commun), but compensation would have to be reduced, according to
Article 2. line 4. of the automobile law (S. C., Oct. 21, 1913, Record of Judg-
ments XVI 6619).
13. If proof is not shown of caution taken by the automobile driver, the
latter would not be able. to establish that the special character of the auto-
mobile Is not the cause of the Injury (S. C., Feb. 8, 1910, Record of Judg-
ments XIII 4938).
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not caused by contributory fault (first defense), or fault of a
third party (second defense), if the aircraft owner has taken all
necessary precautionary measures, and, finally, if this accident
could not be attributed to any structural defect or individual and
special characteristic of the aircraft, force majeure is then the
only cause. Thus, it would be sufficient simply to call the third
defense force majeure.14
We conclude then: the Austrian law institutes liability from
which exemption can be secured only by proof of force majeure,
fault of the injured person or of a third person. It is doubtful
whether one can there recognize liability for created risk; it is
more properly, as commentators speak of it, delictual liability with
a presumption of fault on the part of the person causing the in-
jury, to which French jurisprudence has given an analogous jurid-
ical construction in line 1 of Article 1384 of the Code Napoleon.
Thus aeronautical liability in Austria is based on the principle
of fault, but it is more severe than that of the droit commun
because on the one hand it institutes a presumption of fault on the
part of the aircraft owner, while on the other hand it allows him
to escape liability only by proof of contributory fault, fault of a
third person or by proof of force majeure. The conclusion is that
the person liable is not allowed to exempt himself by proving lack
of fault on his part.
In order to apply this special liability rule, the law stipulates
that the injury subject to compensation must have been caused
by the operation of a motor-driven aircraft.
The Austrian law means by the term "operation" (exploita-
tion) the sum total of energy and effort which it is necessary to
apply in order to achieve directly or indirectly the purpose of an
aircraft. Therefore, an injury would be considered the result of
aircraft operation if such injury was caused by the power which
is inherent in a motor-driven aircraft, even if the part the aircraft
takes in the activity is made against the will of the operator. On
the contrary, damage caused by an aircraft which was put in
motion solely by animal force or vis inertiae could not be due to
operation. Thus the term "operation" includes all functions from
the take-off preparations to the end of the flight, but on the con-
dition that they be directly connected with the flight and present
a specific danger from aviation.'6
According to Article 1 of the automobile law, only death or
14. Hilkowski, op cit., p. 81.
15. Cf. Bielecki & Rapaport, op. cit., p. 38.
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injury to persons or damage to property constitutes damage which
is subject to compensation. In this regard, the law refers us to
the droit commun, where, particularly in. case of death, §1327, Aus-
trian Civil Code, would be applied. It follows that the operator
must not only pay for all damage caused by the death of the in-
jured person but he will be held, according to law, for full pay-
ment of indemnity to all dependents of the deceased, though ob-
viously within the limits of their injury. In case of injury, §§1325
and 1326, Austrian Civil Code. would be applied. Costs of treat-
ment and medicine must be repaid as well as profits lost, and, in
case of incapacity to work, compensation must be paid the injured
person; finally, the latter would have a right to compensation for
sufferings undergone. In regard to damage caused to property,
§1323, Austrian Civil Code, only exacts payment for the actual
damage and not payment for profits which the injured owner
would have been able to make through use of the injured property.
Between the aircraft operation and the injury there must be a
causal relation.
What persons incur this special liability? Article 16 of the
law of December 10, 1919, and article 1 of the automobile law
indicate the owner and crew of the aircraft. Until its amendment
of May 3, 1932, the automobile law still held the operator (ex-
ploitant) liable, but this limitation has since been revoked. If the
aircraft at any time had been unlawfully taken from its owner, the
unlawful possessor would then be liable in his stead. In case the
operator piloted the aircraft professionally in private or public
service, he would not incur liability if the damage had not been
caused through his fault.
Regarding liability for damage caused by aircraft without
motor power, such as free or captive balloons, gliders, kites and
parachutes, the droit commun would be applied, especially §§1293-
1341, Austrian Civil Code, which maintain liability for fault, proof
of which must be made by the plaintiff, i. e., the injured party.
The droit commun holds liable, besides those persons noted in
Article 1 of the automobile law, also all those who through their
own fault have contributed to the damage.
The question is whether liability can be incurred for damage
caused by the normal operation of an aircraft. For example, in
regular flight, the noise of the motor, and so forth, can cause
annoyance to inhabitants of the region flown over, or can even
cause damage in frightening cattle or game. Article 1 of the law
of December 10, 1919, authorizes the flight of aircraft over
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Austrian territory, but on the other hand, §§1295, line 2, and 1305,
Austrian Civil Code, exempt from all liability those persons who
cause damage in the exercise of their rights, providing the exercise
of this right does not purposely cause damage to a third person.
It follows then that any damage caused by the normal flight of an
aircraft would not in general allow any right to compensation,
providing that such flight had not been undertaken with the pur-
pose of creating a nuisance.
To assure the injured person of the opportunity of actually
obtaining compensation which is allowed him, the Austrian law
requires that the aircraft owner contract liability insurance, for
instance in the form of money deposit, without which an aircraft
is not permitted to fly in Austria. This regulation is applicable
both to motor-powered aircraft and to those which are not motor-
powered,' 0 .:and excepts parachutes, inasmuch as they are used only
as an aircraft accessory.
1 7
The regulations providing these insurance guaranties are the
same for all kinds of aircraft. The guaranty must be contracted
with an insurance company licensed to carry on its business in
Austria."' This is effective only for Austrian aircraft; a foreign
aircraft, in order to enter Austria, must offer proof that it has con-
tracted a guaranty of liability or made a deposit to this effect,
either in the country of its nationality, or in another country. 9
The insurance contract must be drawn up in such a manner as to
remain in force in case of change of ownership of the aircraft.
The amount of the insurance is fixed by a competent authority,
'
but in any case it can not be less than the sum of 40,000 shillings
for each person killed or injured, 125,000 shillings for each acci-
dent, and 8,000 shillings for damage to property.2 1 If the guaranty
is in the form of a deposit of money or securities, the regulations
of the droit civil are applied. In such case the minimum value
of the deposit can never be less than 130,000 shillings.
2 2
In r~sum6, the Austrian legislation bases liability toward third
persons on the principle of fault. Where it deals with motor-
powered aircraft, it shows more severity-maifitaining a presump-
tion of fault on behalf of the defendant and limiting his means of
defense. The question is raised as to why more severe rules are




19. §101, line 3.
20. §106.
21. §1, line 1 of the Decree of June 11, 1932.
22. §1, line 2 of the same decree.
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applied to motor-powered aircraft. If it is a question of danger,
there is little doubt that a free balloon is likely to cause damage
more often than an airship; as to gliders, they are as dangerous
to persons on the ground as an airplane. Thus the discrimination
between aircraft with no power but the wind, and those powered
by motors, does not seem rational in the field of liability. Never-
theless the Austrian law possesses a great advantage, that of a
guaranteed payment of compensation awarded to the injured
person.
France
The law of May 31, 1924, relative to air navigation, main-
tains absolute liability for damage caused by the flight of aircraft
or by objects which fall from it onto persons or property on the
surface.
23
This liability is based, as Professor Ripert pointed out in his
report on this consideration to the Commission of the Society for
Legislative Study, that ". . . whoever puts into motion an ap-
paratus for flying creates for mankind a new peril. . . . who-
ever is the cause of an exceptional risk for mankind must take the
consequences of it. ' '2 4 Thus this is the liability for risk. Liability
will be incurred whether the injury is due to fault on the part
of the person liable, unforeseen event, or even force majeure. It
is only fault on the part of the injured person which can relieve
from or lessen the liability of the person causing the injury. In
other words, Article 53 of the law of May 31, 1924, establishes a
formal presumption of liability against the aircraft operator. He
would be able to relieve himself from or lessen liability only in
case of fault of the injured person.2 5
Who are the persons on whom this added liability falls? The
law, in Article 53, states that it is the operator (exploitant). Pro-
fessors Henri and LUon Mazeaud2 6 maintain that two meanings
can' be applied to the term operator. On the one hand is the mean-
ing gardien, which Article 1384, line 1, of the Code Napoleon has
recognized, but on the other hand the definition also includes that
individual who profits materially or otherwise from the operation
23. The regulations of the law of May 31, 1924, are applicable to Algeria
(Decree of the President of the Republic, Jan. 19, 1926), to Occidental French
Africa (Decree of the President of the Republic, Feb. 23, 1926. amended by
Decree of Feb. 14, 1930), and to the other French colonies (Decree of the
President of the Republic, May 11, 1928).
24. Bulletin of the Society for Legislative Study (1921), pp. 287 et' seq.
25. Civ. C. Seine (1st Ch.), Feb. 17, 1930, reported in 14 Rev. de Drolt
A6rlen 674.
26. Trait6 Thdorique et Pratique de la Responsabilit6 Civile, Dellctuelle
et Contractuelle (Paris, 1931), Vol. I, No. 1374.
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of the aircraft. These writers prefer the second meaning, which
seems also to be that of jurisprudence. Thus, in one case, a mili-
tary airplane, at the request of a group of pilots, took part in a
festival and injured one of the spectators. The Tribunal of the
Seine, in deciding who was liable for the damage, maintained that
the group was the operator of the aircraft, to the exclusion of the
state, because this group was the only one to profit therefrom.
This conclusion was reached, although the state had to be con-
sidered as the gardien of the aircraft because it had power to
command and direct.2 7
However, Article 55 maintains that in case the aircraft is
leased, the owner and operator are jointly liable. It follows then
that, in this case, the owner would not be considered as an oper-
ator. But there is no doubt that in case the aircraft is leased, the
owner would profit materially. If then by "operator" (exploitant)
the law means he who receives profit from the aircraft, this desig-
nation would have to apply as well to the owner as to the person
who rented the aircraft. Article 55 would then be inoperative.
It is only necessary to repeat what has been stated in Article 53
that, in making an operator liable, there are surely included within
this meaning, not only one, but many persons, in case many profit
from one and the same aircraft.
On the other hand, if the definition of aircraft operator as
given by Professors Henri and Lon Mazeaud were adopted, who
would be liable in case the aircraft is unlawfully taken from its
owner and causes damage while it is in the hands of the thief?
The conclusion is that the owner is no longer its gardien (owner or
legal possessor), so the thief would be liable, because he is profit-
ing therefrom though it is immaterial to him whether these profits
come legally or illegally. Thus the aircraft owner would not be
liable if the aircraft were stolen, or if he has leased it and entered
the lease in the registration records. 28  If, in this second case, the
legislator has found it possible to exempt the owner from liability,
it is because there is in his stead another person liable, whose name
and address can readily be found by the injured person, and who,
having been inscribed in the'registration records, presents the same
liability guarantees, generally speaking, as the owner-which quite
evidently would not be the same for a thief. Since Articles 53
and following are drawn up entirely in favor of the person injured
by the aircraft, it would be against the wishes of the legislator
27. Civ. Trib. Seine, Feb. 17, 1930, cited above. In the same meaning:
Civ. Trib. Seine, Dec. 2, 1930, reported in 15 Rev. de Droit A(rien 297.
28. Article 55, line 2, of the law of May 31, 1924.
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to exempt the owner of the stolen aircraft from liability. That
is why we speak here of the definition of "operator" (exploitant)
as adopted by doctrine and jurisprudence. It seems to the writer
then that this expression must soon be interpreted as meaning
gardien.
According to Article 53, for'the operator to incur absolute lia-
bility, injury must be caused by the flight of aircraft or by objects
falling from it.
What is meant by the word "aircraft" (a~ronef) ? The law
of May 31, 1924, in Article 1, defines it as any apparatus capable
of leaving the ground and circulating in the air. This would in-
clude any apparatus which can rise into the air without other
assistance than its own power: (1) all balloons-free and captive,
and airships, and (2) all airplanes-landplanes, hydroplanes, am-
ph-hians, autogiros, helicopters, and so forth.
Kites raise a question because they can, with the help of the
wind, rise in the air, although they also need assistance from the
ground; in particular, the cable or rope to which they are attached
must be fastened on the ground and let out as they ascend. They
are thus incapable of rising in the air entirely through their own
power. Nevertheless, this doubtful case must be settled in the
affirmative, and kites must fall within the jurisdiction of the law
of 1924, because they are expressly mentioned as aircraft by
Annex D of the Convention of October 13, 1919.29
Gliders and parachutes are yet to be discussed. The first can
not rise into the air by their own power, for they must be cata-
pulted or towed by an airplane; but once in the air they can not
only remain there for hours, but even can stunt fly and travel for
considerable distances. Evidently they are far from being as
manageable as airplanes: not having their own power, they are
operated only by being catapulted into the air. However, capable
pilots, permitted to choose their own time and height, can fly
them in the desired direction. Can it be considered that gliders are
capable of circulating in the air (circuler dans les airs) ? To
"circulate" means to move in a continuous manner and to return
to the point of departure. Generally, pilots prefer to fly a glider
in a straight line rather than in a circle; it is evident that, very
often, weather conditions hinder the glider from following exactly
the directions of its pilot. However, there is little doubt at the
present time that a glider can travel in the air and return to its
29. France deposited its ratification of this Convention, June 1, 1922.
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point of departure. It is then with reason that the Tribunal
of Vitry-le-Francois, in its decision of July 14, 1932, held that
gliders are within the jurisdiction of the law of May 31, 1924. 0
Lastly we must discuss parachutes. It is evident that they
are incapable of rising or flying through the air; they serve only
to diminish the falling speed of objects or persons. Thus para-
chutes are not included in the air navigation law. And, in case
a person making a parachute jump causes damage on the surface,
he would be liable only in conformity with the droit commun.
The operator of the aircraft, from which the parachute jump had
been made, could not come within the jurisdiction of Article 53
and would incur liability only in case of personal fault. It would
be different if objects-newspapers, for example-were thrown
from an aircraft and were attached to a parachute. The air-
craft operator in this case would be liable in conformity with
Articles 53 and 54, because these regulations, though making him
liable for the falling or throwing of any object-even of regular
ballast-do not distinguish whether this object is attached to a
parachute or not. It is surprising that the air navigation law
deals only with falling objects and not falling persons.
We have explained what should be meant by the term "air-
craft (aronef) and the phrase "the objects which drop from it"
(les objets qui s'en d~tachent). We have yet to understand the
meaning of the "movements of the aircraft" (les 6volutions de
l'aronef). Evidently, an aircraft ivolue as soon as it is in the
air. But can it be said that it ivolue when it is rolling along the
ground or is moving on the surface of the water? And, affirma-
tively, from what moment can the movement on land or water
be considered as ivolution within the meaning of Article 53? One
theory states that: "when the movement of the apparatus on land
is the beginning or completion of a flight (take-off or landing of
the airplane), the law of 1924 must apply, because this movement
is closely linked to the flight itself and because dangers are par-
ticularly great at the landing and take-off. . . . But if the
apparatus changes its position on land for another reason (for
example, an apparatus which leaves its hangar and goes toward the
point where it will take off), this apparatus is in every respect
similar to an automobile; Article 1384, §1, only will apply." 81
However, jurisprudence interprets the word 6volution more
broadly. It holds that the 6volution begins not at the moment the
30. The Journal, Les Allies, 1933, No, 624, p. 12.
31. Mazeaud, H. & L., op. cit., Vol. I, NO. 1381.
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airplane rolls along the ground in order to take off into flight, but
when, with its propellers revolving, it begins under its own power
to roll over the ground. So also would be the case where the
airplane rolls along the ground simply to return to its hangar at
the airport.12  Thus, contrary to the point of view of doctrine, as
soon as the aircraft is in motion under its own power, whether on
land or water, it is in 9volution within the meaning of Article 53.
To avoid absolute liability or even to lessen it, the aircraft
operator must show proof of fault of the injured person. Any
other cause, though it be the fault of a third person, risk of the
air, or even force majeure, can not be taken into consideration
and the liability of the operator is still absolute. The regulations
of the law point out that fault of the person injured would com-
pletely free the operator from liability only if the injury caused
as well as the fault of the person injured took place at the airport.
In any other case, fault of the injured person could scarcely bring
about anything but a partial liability (lessening of the liability)
because the accident would not have happened if aviation had not
existed.3
Thus, in case of damage on the surface caused by an aircraft
under the conditions just mentioned, the operator will be held for
full compensation for the damage, whatever it may be: death or
injury to persons, destruction or damage to property.
The question always arises as to whether the damage, to be
compensable according to Article 53, must necessarily be caused
by an accident or, equally, by the normal operation of an aircraft.
Article 19 of the law of May 31, 1924, has granted to aircraft the
right of innocent passage over French territory. Would not this
freedom be impaired if aircraft operators were held liable for
damage which a normal flight might cause on the surface? It
would seem so at first glance, but this would be poor reasoning.
Article 53 makes the aircraft operator liable for all damage caused
by his aircraft, without making any distinction as to whether it
had been caused by an accident or by the normal operation of the
aircraft. On the other hand, line 2 of Article 19 limits the free-
dom of passage by stating that a flight can not be made if it inter-
feres with the exercise of the rights of the landowner. The re-
sult is that the operator is as liable for damage caused by a single
32. Crim. Cass., Mar. 6, 1931, and report of Counsellor Bourgeon in 15
Rev. de Droit Adrien 562, et seq.
33. Report made to the Senate by M. Vallier, in the name of the Com-
mission de lAgislation Civile et Criminelle, ordered to examine the draft of
the law adopted by the Chamber of Deputies relative to air navigation: Senate
Documents, 1923, No. 473, p. 5.
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flight of his aircraft as for injury caused, for example, by the
crash of his ship or by objects falling from it. He would thus be
responsible for depreciation in the value of property, as well as for
nuisance caused by frequent and continued flights of aircraft, for
disturbance caused by the noise of motors, and so forth." This
point of view was adopted by the courts even before the pro-
mulgation of the law of air navigation. 6
In r~sum , the French law applies absolute liability to the air-
craft operator, only allowing him to avoid it by proof of the fault
of the person injured. Compensation is limited only by the ex-
tent of the damage. On the other hand, the victim is not guar-
anteed against the insolvency of the party liable. The conclusion
is that the remedy given by the law of May 31, 1924, is very un-
favorable to airmen, and yet does not give any actual advantage
to persons on the ground.
Germany
Liability for injury caused to third persons on the surface is
regulated by the same rules and in the same manner as that toward
other travelers.3  But, actually, the application of these regula-
tions is very different, because the non-liability clause evidently
can not apply when. it has to deal with injuries caused to third
persons.
The air navigation law of August 1, 1922, provides two sys-
tems of liability: on the one hand, §§19 and following introduce
objective liability (responsabiliti objective) ; on the other hand,
§28 maintains droit commun liability such as is expressed by the
Civil Code.3 7
Paragraph 19 proceeds from the principle that any person
who, to his own advantage, operates a dangerous instrument must
always bear the burden of the damage which he causes to a third
person (created risk). It is entirely indifferent as to whether or
not any fault be committed. Force majeure and, with more rea-
son, the act or fault of a third person would not serve as defenses.
The law, in instituting such severe liability, evidently limited, in
very exact fashion, the field of its application. In the first place,
34. See Tissot. Jean, De la Responsabilit6 en Matire de Navigation
Afrienne (Paris, 1925), pp. 187 et seq.
35. Bertrand, Briquant, Mange v. Soci&t6 Farman, Civ. Trib. Seine, July
6, 1912, Gaz. Pal., 1912.2.41; Heurtebise v. Farman Esnault-Pelterie et Socidtd
Bore7, Civ. Trib. Seine, June 10, 1914, D. 1914.2.193.
36. See Kaftal. Andre, Reparation des Dommages Causes aux Voyageurs
dans les Transports Atiens (Paris, 1930), pp. 12 et seq.
37. Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch.
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the liability of §19 would be applied only to damage caused by
the operation of aircraft.
Paragraph 1 means by "aircraft": airships, airplanes, balloons,
kites, and any other mechanical device constructed for the purpose
of moving in the air. Paragraph 1 of Chapter A of the ordinance
of July 19, 1930,88 explains what would be qualified as aircraft
as well as gliders and parachutes.
What is meant by the expression "operation"? Evidently, it
is not identical with that of "flight" (vol). The latter is not as
broad as the first. An aircraft would be considered in operation
from the time it is under the control of motive power3 9 sufficient
to sustain and propel it through the air. For airplanes, such power
would be the wind and motor; for airships, gas must be added;
for balloons, the wind and gas; for gliders, the wind. Thus, an
airplane would be in operation as soon as its motor is started-
even though it be only for the purpose of testing the motor; or
when the wind causes it to move-even if the motor is not going.
The operation can be considered ended only when the aircraft is
in such a position that neither the wind nor its motor can cause
it to move. A glider would be in operation as soon as the wind
catches its surface; the airship and balloon, as soon as they are
filled with a sufficient amount of gas to raise them in the air. We
see then that the regulations of §19 would be applied in securing
compensation for damage caused not only during flight, but also
during certain maneuvers preparatory to the take-off of the aircraft.
The operation of the aircraft must be a direct cause of the
damage. To decide whether this causal relation exists, the German
doctrine is based on the theory of adequate cause.4" This theory,
often applied in Germany, is, as Professor Demogue has so ably
explained, 1 that a "condition, to be qualified as a cause should
make the same result objectively possible through its appearance
alone. The more a cause renders a result probable, the more it
should be qualified as adequate." Thus, the aircraft operation
must, in general, be able to cause the injury in question. If this
aircraft operation could have caused the injury only under unusual
conditions, extraneous to the normal operation of the aircraft, it
would be different. It is necessary that the damage be the im-
mediate and direct result of the aircraft operation. Thus §19
38. Reichsgesetzblatt 1 S. 363.
39. Schleicher, Dr. Riltdger, Luftverkehrsgesetz (Berlin. 1933), pp. 98-99.
Contra: Wmmer. Haftpflichtschiiden nach s19 des Luftverkehrsgesetzes in der
Praxis. 3 Archly fUr Luftrecht 76. 77.
40. Schleicher, op. cit., p. 99.
41. Tralt des Obligations en Gfntral, Vol. IV, No. 375.
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could not be applied, for example, in securing compensation for
injury to a person who had a heart attack while seeing the acci-
dent, or on learning that one of his neighbor passengers had been
killed.4
2
The damage must be caused by an accident. By "accident" is
meant an unexpected event, suddenly causing death or injury to a
human being or damage to property. It follows that the regula-
tions of §19 could not be applied in case of damage caused to
property owners of rural property the value of which was de-
preciated by continued flight of aircraft.
Objective liability instituted by §19 could be applied only:
(a) in case of danger to the life or safety of persons. Thus in-
jury caused by a delay could not be considered, even if the delay
is caused by an air accident. On the other hand, §§21 and 22
limit the extent of injury subject to compensation; (b) in case
of injury and destruction to property.
In general, objective liability-is incurred only by the possessor
(dMtenteur), i. e., by the person who possesses and uses the air-
craft for his own purposes, taking the profits and assuming the
costs of his enterprise. It is not necessary that the possessor be
also the owner of the aircraft, though generally this will be the
case. If the, aircraft is used without the authorization and knowl-
edge of its possessor, the latter will be exempt from his liability,
which in turn will fall entirely on the person who unlawfully uses
the aircraft. However, the legitimate possessor (dMtenteur
ligitime) will be jointly liable with the latter in case the unlawful
use of the aircraft has been made possible through his fault.
The only defense of the possessor of an aircraft lies in proof
of the fault of the person injured, which defense is specifically
mentioned by §20. In order to estimate the proportion of com-
pensation to be paid by the possessor of the aircraft, according
to the extent of fault of the injured person, droit commun rules
must be followed. 4 The fault of the person injured should there-
fore coincide with the sustaining of the injury, which would occur
when not only the accident but the injury itself would be the
natural outcome of the fault (nWgligence) of the injured person.
Thus the fault of the person injured, though coincident with the
sustaining of the injury, could just as well take place before the
42. Wimmer, op. cit., p. 79.
43. Especially §254 of the Civil Code (B. 0. B.).
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accident4 ' as after." By the term "person injured" (victime), the
law means the person whose body, safety or property has been
damaged. Nevertheless, since the law well recognizes the right
which persons indirectly injured have to compensation, 46 it must
be admitted that their fault could exempt the possessor of the
aircraft, at least to some degree. It is evident that, in general,
fault in this class of persons could occur only after the accident.41
On the other hand, fault of the gardiens or possessors of the ob-
ject damaged must evidently be considered.
This very severe liability is nevertheless limited by §23 to the
sum of 25,000 marks-capital or 1,500 marks annuity for injury to
or death of the injured person. If the same accident injures many
persons, the total sum of compensation which can be allowed them
must not exceed 75,000 marks-capital or 4,500 marks annuity.
Compensation for property can not exceed the total sum of 5,000
marks.
Besides objective liability, instituted by §§19 and following
of the law of air navigation, this law maintains droit commun
liability, as set forth by the Civil Code, and expressly stated by
§28 of the said law. Thus, the injured person could choose be-
tween instituting an action based on the specific air law regulations
or one based on the rules of the Civil Code.
Recourse to the civil law is had whenever one of the man),
conditions which will be enumerated and which are necessary for
application of the severe regulations of the air law fails. This
will be the case when damage caused by an aircraft will not be
the result of an accident; for example, damage caused to property
by continued flight of aircraft; 4 when the aircraft, at the time it
caused damage, was not in operation; when it is a question of
making a charge against the pilot or any other person, excepting
the possessor of the aircraft; when the injured person wishes to
get compensation for an injury such as caused by delay, and so
forth; finally when the damage exceeds the sum as indicated in
"§23 of the air navigation law.
Thus the droit continun" allows greater possibilities to the
injured person and allows him to secure full compensation, but its
44. For example, the victim, in spite of a barrier, has crossed onto the
aircraft territory.
45. For example, the victim, slightly injured, goes to a quack doctor who
makes his injury much more serious.
46. For example, persons who have borne the expenses of funerals or
those who had been dependent upon the person injured.
47. Kilkowski, op. cit., pp. 67 et seq.
48. Nevertheless Schleicher is of a different opinion; he believes that no
liability can be incurred in a case where there is no accident.
49. D. 0. B.
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application has the disadvantage of making it necessary that the
plaintiff show proof of fault on the part of the defendant. It will
then be in only extremely rare cases that the injured person could
base his suit on the rules of the droit commun.
The German legislator, in dealing with air accident victims
as a group, wished to safeguard them from the risk of insolvency
on the part of the aircraft possessor. To this effect, §29 of the
air navigation law of August 1, 1922, as well as Chapter K of the
ordinance of July 19, 1930,50 has granted a special guaranty to
the victims of aviation accidents. Particularly, before receiving
permission to operate an aircraft, the aircraft possessor must show
proof that he has contracted insurance to the maximum amount
indicated by §23 of the law of August 1, 1922, or at least that he
has furnished security by the deposit of money or securities, suffi-
cient to guarantee a trust fund to be used for payment of dam-
ages. The insurance must be contracted with an insurance com-
pany whose operation is authorized by the Reich, and the policy
must be drawn up in such a manner that it will continue in force,
in case of a change of possessor, throughout the period of the
insurance contract. It must be noted that the security deposit can
serve as damages payment only in case the aircraft possessor: (1)
would be bankrupt; (2) would delay payments; or (3) would stop
operations-operation of his aircraft or several aircraft. On the
other hand, the aircraft possessor could only recover the sum or
securities deposited as security at the end of the fourth month
following the completion of business operations.
It is obvious that a guaranty in the form of a security deposit
proves very impractical, both for the person injured and for the air-
craft possessor, whereas in the form of insurance it presents many
advantages and benefits to both parties. Unfortunately, the form
in which it is adopted in Germany presents certain faults which
it would be impossible to eradicate. Specifically, the injured per-
son can not take direct action against the underwriter; he can only
bring suit against the aircraft possessor; the insurance policy does
not cover damage caused by a wrong (dol) on the part of the in-
sured; it will be valid only in case the papers on board the aircraft
are in order and if the aircraft has the regulation certificates and
licenses; lastly, the policy does not, cover damage caused by the
aircraft, if it is being operated by an unlawful possessor. Thus,
the person injured has no guaranty in those cases where he most
needs it.
50. R. G. B1. 1, p. 363
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In r~sum6, the German law, while adopting the principle of
absolute liability, limits compensation to a relatively modest sum.
This system is completed by a guaranty granted the person injured
as security against insolvency of the liable party. The solution ex-
pressed by the German legislator seems quite practical, and, if
certain changes were made, the interests of the airmen and those
of persons on the surface would be adjusted.
Great Britain
Liability for damage caused by aircraft to third persons on
the surface is regulated by the Air Navigation Act of 1920.11
From its promulgation, this law has been applicable in Eng-
land, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Sec-
tion 4 of this Act authorizes the King, by decree of Council, to
extend the jurisdiction of this law to all British possessions, ex-
cepting the Dominions and India. By order of the King, rendered
in Council, the law of 1920 was extended in 1922 to the Colonies,52
in 1927 to the Territories under Mandate,5 3 and lastly was adopted
by the Irish Free State.
54
Since Great Britain is signatory to the Convention of Paris of
October 13, 1919, in which Annex D defines the expression "air-
craft," this definition was necessarily included in English aero-
nautical laws. Thus Article 31 of the Consolidated Order, 1923,
Number 1508, states that the word "aircraft" means all captive and
free balloons, kites, airships and airplanes. Consequently, the aero-
nautical laws do not apply to gliders and parachutes. Furthermore,
Section 18 of the Air Navigation Act maintains that this law will
not apply to aircraft belonging to His Majesty or exclusively set
aside for his service. Thus the regulations of the aeronautical
law do not apply to military aircraft (whether they belong to the
land army, to naval forces, or to air forces), or to aircraft destined
solely for civil service of the Crown, or to iircraft belonging to
the King or used by him in his personal service.
Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act deals with liability. fn
view of the very particular terms of this text, and for purposes
of clarity, the essential part is quoted, as follows:
• • but where material damage or loss is caused by an aircraft in
flight, taking-off, or landing, or by any person in any such aircraft, or by
any article falling from any such aircraft, to any person or property on
51. 10-11, Geo. V., c. 80.
52. S. R. and 0., 1922, No. 121.
53. S. R. and 0.. 1927, No. 1244.
54. Air Navigation Act, 1920; Adaptation Order. 1928.
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land or water, damages shall be recoverable from the owner of the aircraft
in respect of such damage or loss, without proof of negligence or intention
or other cause of action, as though the same had been caused by his willful
act, neglect or default, except where the damage or loss was caused by or
contributed to by the negligence of the person by whom the same was
suffered.
What is the character of this liability? Theoretical opinions
are divided. Certain writers see in it the principle of absolute
liability; 55 others believe that Section 9 combines two principles:
on the one hand, the rule concerning the transfer of the burden
of proof, known as res ipsa loquitur, and on the other, the rule
concerning created risk.56 Finally, others see in it only a rule con-
cerning distribution of proof, a simple presumption of fault of the
aircraft owner.5 7
Personally, the writer believes that we cannot recognize in it
the principle of absolute liability. This for the following reasons:
if the British legislator had wished to introduce absolute liability,
he would have found it sufficient to have a brief, clear text stating
simply that liability was incurred for damage caused on the sur-
face by an aircraft or an object falling from the aircraft. He
could even have added "absolute liability" as the Uniform State
Law of Aeronautics of the United States has done. Instead of
that, Section 9 explains at length that this damage'would be judged
to be caused by the negligence of the aircraft owner, and it adds-
which seems superfluous-that the injured person need not show
proof of this negligence.
The writer believes that the intent of the British legislation is
clear. It creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the
aircraft owner and nothing further. The purpose of this regula-
tion is to set aside the application of the common law to the regu-
lation of proof. Generally, the English law, as well as the law of
continental countries, requires that the plaintiff show proof of
fault on the part of, the defendant. Since the person injured in
an aircraft accident is almost always unable to furnish such proof,
then, that he may obtain compensation, the legislator comes to his
rescue by transferring the burden of proof. But the objection is
that, in England as well as in the United States, the common law
rule of res ipsa loquitur is applied, which in some cases frees the
plaintiff from the duty of proving fault of the defendant. It
would therefore be quite useless to add special regulations.
55. McNair, Arnold 9i.. The Law of the Air (London, 1932), p. 68.
56. G. D. Nokes 4 H. P. Bridges, The Law of Aviation (1930), p. 190.
57. Winfield & Sparkes. The Law In Relation to Aircraft (London, 1928),
p. 141 ; Holdsworth, The Law of Transport (London, 1932) p. 147.
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Evidently, this observation has its importance, but if the rule
of res ipsa loquitur is always applied when an object is thrown
from a plane, nevertheless there will be cases where it could not
apply in the action concerning injury caused on the surface by the
aircraft itself. Thus this rule is applicable only to damage which,
obviously and in consideration of the normal circumstances ac-
companying it, is caused by the negligence of the defendant. Thus
this rule would not necessarily be applied to all damage caused by
an aircraft. For example, suppose that, in a heavy fog, an aircraft
pilot strikes the roof of a house and causes damage. It is very
doubtful whether one can immediately recognize negligence of the
pilot. The writer does not believe that the English courts would
be able to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur in such a case. In-
stead he believes that, precisely for this reason, the British legis-
lator thought it useful to introduce into air law the presumption
of fault of the aircraft owner.
Section 9 shows us exactly at what moment the aircraft is
likely to incur liability as expressed by this text, especially at the
take-off, i. e., the complete maneuver carried out on the ground
for taking off. The aircraft also incurs this liability upon land-
ing, or, in other words, as long as it rolls along the surface or
moves on the water through passive resistance.
Compensation must be paid not only for a direct injury,
caused by physical harm to a person or by destruction of property,
but also for nuisance and disturbance caused by the flight of air-
craft to landowners on the surface.58
Generally, liability is incurred by the aircraft owner. How-
ever, line 2 of Section 9 of the Air Navigation Act frees him of
all liability in case he has bona fide rented the aircraft for at least
14 days, and on condition that no member of the crew is in his
service. In this case, the lessee of the aircraft alone will be liable.
Furthermore, in case the damage has been caused solely through
the fault of a third person, the aircraft owner will have recourse
against the latter.
We have yet to discuss the defenses available to the aircraft
owner. Section 9 only mentions negligence (fault) of the person
injured. Proof would not be the necessary condition of absolute
liability nor even of liability for presumed fault. Because, in the
latter case, it is quite useless to state that the fault of the injured
58. A. D. McNair cites in The Law of the Air a case granting compensa-
tion for continued flight at low altitude over the property belonging to a
young ladies' school near Brighton (Roedean School, Ltd. v. Cornwall Aviation
Co., Ltd. A Phillips).
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person relieves the aircraft owner from liability, since any proof
of absence of fault of the defendant is sufficient as a defense.
This objection seems important. Nevertheless, in looking more
closely at the text of Section 9, one can readily understand that
the legislator simply wished to do away with presumption of
negligence of the aircraft owner in case of fault of the person
injured. If the presumption of fault is eliminated and if there
only remains the fault of the injured person, as the only cause of
the injury, it is easily understood that this latter would have
nothing to claim from the aircraft owner.
But let us suppose that the fault of the injured person only
contributed to the injury, while the negligence of the defendant
was proved. Three possible cases of this contributory negligence
present themselves. The plaintiff had been negligent, but his fault
would not of itself have been able to cause the damage, if the
defendant had not subsequently been grossly negligent. In this
case, the damage would be entirely admitted. On the contrary,
the negligence of the plaintiff creates by itself the situation wherein
the defendant, not having sufficient time necessary for considera-
tion, could not take such measures as would avoid the injury, as
he would otherwise have been able to do. In this case the de-
fendant is entirely exempt. Lastly, there would be the case where
the joint negligence of defendant and plaintiff was the cause of the
injury. Then, in conformity to the common law, the plaintiff
would not receive compensation, and, in accordance with the Ad-
miralty regulations (applicable to damage caused on sea), the
damage would be apportioned.
If we take as our point of departure the point of view of
Section 9, which expresses absolute liability of the aircraft owner,
contributory fault could only be explained as exemption of the
defendant from all liability, even though the fault of the plaintiff
had only slightly contributed to the damage. On the contrary, if,
as the writer believes, presumption of fault is recognized, i. e.,
a rule regarding distribution of proof, then the section concerning
tault of the injured person could, as has already been mentioned
mean only the elimination of presumption of negligence. We re-
turn then to the common law, and by this means even the injured
person who has contributed to the injury can sometimes obtain
either entire or at least partial compensation.
No explanation is necessary of the other defenses of the
aircraft owner, because if it is believed that he incurs absolute lia-
bility, there would be no defenses. If we otherwise grant only
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presumption of fault, the means of defense are those of the com-
mon law.
In r6sum6, the English law institutes liability for fault, and
adopts more severe rules toward the defendant than does the
common law.
Italy
The problem of compensation for damage caused by aircraft
to third persons on the surface is regulated by complicated rules,
hard to understand, which jurisprudence and doctrine interpret in
different ways.
In order to explain correctly the opinion of some writers and
the point of view of certain decisions, we must first study the
aeronautical legislation prior to that now in force. This law,
since repealed, particularly the royal decree of November 27, 1919,
maintained in Article 8 a presumption of liability for damage
caused by aircraft, against the person or persons causing the injury,
the commanding officer and the aircraft owner. This presumption
could be avoided only by proof of absolute force majeure.
The present law, especially the decree of August 20, 1923, has
not upheld this Article. On the contrary, it has preferred to dis-
tinguish many cases of damage. Notably, Article 38 states that
if an object is thrown, the right to damages for the injury caused
is always granted. As to damage caused by the falling of ob-
jects, during the take-off or landing of aircraft,5 9 the right to com-
pensation is likewise granted, providing it had not been caused
by force majeure. The present law does not mention any other
causes of injury to third persons. It is limited in Article 40 to an
enumeration of persons liable for the injuries caused by aircraft,
and it adds that in case of contributory fault on the part of the
injured person the rules of droit commun will be applied.
Thus the law of August 20, 1923, deals with exceptional cases,
such as the throwing and falling of objects, but it says nothing
regarding the more frequent possibilities, i. e., the crash of the
aircraft and forced landings. The complicated regulations of this
law, as well as the serious deficiencies which are found in it,
have aroused contradictory comment.
Thus, M. Musto 60 maintains that the present law institutes
59. The Law of air navigation of Jan. 11, 1925, In Article 1 describes an
aircraft as a mechanism or equipment which is capable of carrying persons and
things by using the sustaining force of the air, either static or dynamic. Air-
craft are divided into airplanes, hydroplanes, kites, airships, free or captive
balloons.
60. L'Aeromobile (Naples, 1926), p. 61.
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absolute liability in all cases of damage caused on the surface of
the earth. He states that Article 38 of the law of 1923 is only a
wordy and imperfect reproduction of Article 8 of the law of
1919, which, according to him, in allowing only absolute force
majeure as a defense, maintains no delictual liability, but only
absolute liability. It is true that Article 38 only regulates com-
pensation for damage caused by the throwing or falling of objects.
However, according to the writer, the silence of the law of 1923 on
other causes of injuries, especially in comparison with the laws of
certain countries (France, for example) which apply the principle
of absolute liability to these other cases, authorizes the application
of the same principle to injuries the causes of which are not speci-
fied in Article 38.
Another writer, M. Brasiello,6 1 takes the contrary view of the
theory expressed by M. Musto. He believes that the law of 1923
never recognized-even in cases of the throwing of objects-abso-
lute liability, but simply upholds a presumption of fault on the
part of those persons responsible for the aircraft, in every case
without exception.
Some writers,6 2 while criticizing the law of 1923 in a dif-
ferent way, believe that the throwing of objects gives rise to
absolute liability, falling objects to the presumption of fault,
while in all other cases the droit commun will be applied, i. e.,
that the injured person will be held to show proof of fault on the
part of the possessor of the aircraft.
Lastly, Professor Ambrosini believes that the law of 1923
sanctions the principle of liability according to the droit commun,
demanding proof of fault in all cases, except in that of throwing
objects, where the principle of objective liability will be applied.63
Italian jurisprudence lacks uniformity. The lower courts hold
that all damage caused on the surface of the earth gives rise to
absolute liability, which they maintain to be upheld by Articles 38
and 40 of the law of 1923.64 The higher courts admit that in such
a case as foreseen by Article ' 40 there could be a question only of
liability according to the droit commun. In any case, there is
neither absolute liability nor presumption of liability as supported
61. La Navigazione Aerea nel Diritto (Naples, 1925).
62. Savoia, Cesare, La ResponsabilitA Civile del Vettore Aereo (Rome,
1928) ; Cortesani, Giuseppe, La Responsabilltt nel Diritto Aereo (Torlno, 1929)
Fragali, Michele, Principii di Diritto Aeronautico (Padua, 1930).
63. "Caratteristiche Fondamentali del la' Responsabilitk" 5 I1 Diritto
Aeronautico 164 et seQ.
64. Trib. Florence, Feb. 24, 1928, Biondi Ferri v. Ministero Aeronautico
A Buonsembiante, reported in 5 Diritto Aeronautlco 213 et seq., reversed by
Court of Florence. No. 10, 1928 ; Trib. Milan, July 2, 1927, Imperiali v. Miniatero
Aeronautico, reported in 12 Rev. Jurid. de la Loc. A6rienne 246 et seq., affd.
by Court of Milan & denied by the Court of Cassation, Feb. 28, 1929.
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by Article 8 of the law of 1919. Thus Article 40 of the law of
1923 does not exempt the third person injured from the obligation
to furnish proof of the fault of the person causing the injury. On
the contrary, a typical case of objective liability is found in Article
38, for damage caused by objects thrown from an aircraft during
the course of its flight.6 5
Personally, the writer believes that the law of 1923 provided
three systems of liability:
(1) The throwing of an object, as provided in Article 38,
always gives rise to compensation for the damage which it causes.
The law allows no defense. Therefore, the liability is absolute.
(2) Injury caused by falling objects-following a take-off
or landing-must in principle always be compensated, without con-
sidering the cause of their fall. However, Article 38 carefully
states that force majeure would constitute in this case a valid
defense. Thus, in principle, it suffices for the purpose of imposing
liability to show that the injury was caused by a falling object.
Hence, the injured person will only have to furnish proof of an
object falling from an aircraft, the damage caused, and a causal
relation between the two. But, on the other hand, the law cate-
gorically states that liability will not be incurred if proof of force
majeure is furnished-which prevents the application of the prin-
ciple of absolute liability.
The writer does not desire to adopt the point of view of Pro-
fessor Ambrosini, who believes that even in such a case the person
injured is obliged to show proof of fault of the defendant. If
this view were correct, the regulations of Article 38 concerning
ialling objects could no longer be explained. This text states
clearly that injuries caused by falling objects during the take-off
or landing of an aircraft give rise to compensation, except in case
of force majeure. Why would the injured person have to show
proof of fault of the person liable, if he is exempted by the same
law-especially since the meaning of Article 38 is clearly that, in
case no fault be proved against the defendant, he would still incur
liability unless he showed proof of force majeure.
(3) All other cases not dealt with by Article 38 remain to
be discussed. These are questions of injuries caused by the crash
of an aircraft, by its landing and take-off, and so forth--otherwise
spoken of as the cases of more frequent damage. The law of
1923 has not reproduced the regulations which regulated them in
65. Court of Appeal of Florence, Nov. 10, 1928 ; Court of Cassatlon, Feb. 28,
1929; Court of Cassatlon, Dec. 3, 1929. These three decisions are reported
in 1 Rev. Generale de Drolt Arlen 461 et seq.
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the law of 1919. Article 40 of the present law, which alone can
be said to correspond to Article 8 of the repealed law, contains
only one rule common to both texts, that of joint liability of the
aircraft owner, the operator, and the person causing the injury.
The analogy does not go far, because, if Article 8 institutes the
presumption of culpability, Article 40 mentions nothing of it. On
the contrary, the last line of this Article provides expressly for
the application of the droit commun in the case of contributory
fault. Thus, the lack of an exact rule in the law of 1923 and its
comparison with the law of 1919 definitely shows that the intention
of the legislator was not to institute objective liability, as M. Musto
believes, or a presumption of culpability, as M. Brasiello maintains,
but to apply the liability of the droit commun in allowing only one
derogation, that of joint liability, which is mentioned by this law.
In all cases where the aircraft owner incurs liability without
having committed a fault (which would be so in case of damage
caused by an object thrown), he would have the power to turn
his aircraft over to the persons injured (Article 42). This sur-
render frees him from the necessity of paying further compensa-
tion to the injured persons. It is doubtful whether the latter
would derive any great satisfaction from it.6
We see then that the law of 1923, far from upholding the
principle of liability instituted by prior air legislation, has returned
to the droit commun and permits severe liability only in excep-
tional cases.
Poland
Liability toward third persons, regulated by the decree of the
President of the Republic, March 14, 1928, dealing with air law,
is analogous to that toward other travellers."7 It is based on a
presumption of fault of the aircraft owner. 8 The injured per-
son is only obliged to furnish proof of damage caused by the use
of the aircraft. 9 The aircraft owner will be exempt from liability
if he is able to establish: (1) the fault of the injured person, or
66. See Kaftal, Andre, R6paration des Dommages Causes aux Voyageurs
dans les Transports Afriens (Paris, 1930), pp. 21 et seq.
67. See Kaltal, Andr6, Komentarz do rozporzadzenta Prezydenta Rzeczy-
pospoliteJ z dn. 14 marca 1928 r. o prawie lotniczem (Warsaw, 1928).
68. Article 4 means by aircraft: balloons, airships, airplanes, gliders
and other equipment capable of remaining in the air and carrying persons and
things. Since Poland has ratified the Convention of Oct. 13, 1919. we must
note that article 4 is in conformity with the definition given by Annex B of
this Convention. Consequently, captive balloons and kites must be considered
as aircraft.
69. Article 59.
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(2) force majeure, or, lastly, (3) that he had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the accident.70
Concerning the fault of the injured person, we know that this
can serve as a defense, though it be the principle on which liability
is based. As for force majeure, it can only exempt from liability
as based on the principle of fault. The third exemption, mentioned
by Article 60, must be studied more closely.
In instituting, on the one hand, presumption of liability against
the aircraft owner and allowing him, on the other hand, to contest
it by proof that he had taken the necessary measures to avoid the
accident, the law has not only allowed the party liable to prove
that he had not been at fault, but also-and this is even more in-
teresting-the law has given a definition of fault of the aircraft
owner. Particularly, his fault could consist only in the fact that
he had not taken all possible measures to avoid the accident which
caused the damage. Thus the aeronautical law places upon the
aircraft owner no duty at all-such as does the civil law,7 ' but
the much more restricted duty of taking all safety measures to
avoid the accident. The result is that, in a case where such meas-
ures were taken, the owner would not have to answer for the
damage caused by all accident involving his aircraft. On the
other hand, in order that liability as outlined by the aeronautical
law be maintained, a causal relation between the absence of safety
measures and the damage caused by the use of the aircraft is
necessary, because delictual liability can be incurred only in case
the fault of the party liable is the cause of the damage.
The regulations of the Polish aeronautical law may be pre-
sented then in the following manner. The aircraft owner is only
obliged to take all possible measures to avoid accidents. In case
failure to carry out this duty (i. e., his fault) has caused an in-
jury, he will be liable and held to pay full compensation. To aid
the injured person, who in the greater number of cases is absolute-
ly unable to show sufficient proof of this fault of the aircraft
owner as well as a causal relation between him and the injury, the
legislator has instituted a double presumption against the liable
party. In particular: any damage caused by the use of an aircraft
creates, on the one hand, a presumption of fault of its owner
(omission of safety measures to avoid accidents), and, on the other
hand, the presumption of a causal relation between this presumed
fault and the injury caused the victim.
70. Article 60.
71. Article 1382 et seq., Code Napoleon applied in Poland.
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Consequently, in order to be exempt from the particular lia-
bility instituted by the law of March 14, 1928, the aircraft owner
must deal with one of these two presumptions. Either he will
show proof of having taken all possible measures to avoid the ac-
cident or he will prove that their absence is not the cause of the
damage or the accident. In other words, it will be sufficient that
he prove that the injury would have resulted even in case all pos-
sible measures for safety had been taken.
The law of March 14, 1928, allows two additional defenses:
force majeure and the fault of the injured person, which seems
superflous. In showing that the injury had been caused by force
majeure or by fault of the injured person, the aircraft owner
establishes thereby that the injury was not due to his own fault.
If he has then neglected to take safety measures to avoid the in-
jury, his negligence however has not caused the damage. In
other words, proof of force majeure or contributory fault leads
back to proof of lack of causal relation between the defendant's
fault and the damage caused the plaintiff, i. e.,'to the greater
exemption allowed by line 3 of Article 60.
What are the injuries for which the aircraft owner incurs
liability in the aeronautical law? In the first place, it seems that
there can be no doubt in this regard, since Article 59, line 1 of
the law of March 14, 1928, categorically states, without limitation,
that the aircraft owner is liable for all damage caused by the use
of his aircraft. Consequently, whatever the cause of this damage,
whether it results from an accident or the normal operation of an
aircraft, its owner always incurs liability such as defined by line 1
of Article 59, and therefore he is presumed to be at fault.
However, this reasoning is not exact, because in order to
evaluate the special liability instituted by the aeronautical law,
consideration cannot be based solely on the text of line 1 of Arti-
cle 59. It is true that this text institutes a presumption of liability
against the aircraft owner, but to define its extent and application
we must turn to Article 60. And we have already seen that, in
conformity with this Article, the owner will be exempt from lia-
bility, either in case he has taken all possible measures to avoid
the accident, or in case there is no causal relation between the ac-
cident and the injury. But, if the injury is due, for example,
to the normal operation of the aircraft, without any accident con-
tributing to it, or even if none had happened, it is evident that
the central idea of liability, as instituted by the aeronautical law is
defective, and Article 59, line 1, would not be applied.
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But, in this case-when the injury is not caused by an acci-
dent-would the aircraft owner, freed from the particular liability
of the aeronautical law, incur that of the droit communf Article
59, line 4, states that any person, whose fault has caused an in-
jury, incurs liability jointly with the aircraft owner. Evidently,
this regulation returns us to the droit commun, to liability for fault
as summed up in Article 1382 of the Code Napoleon. What per-
sons are meant in Article 59, line 4? These are the pilot, mech-
anic, radio operator, passenger, and so forth, as well as the owner
or possessor of the aircraft-always on condition that the person
injured succeeds in showing proof of their fault. As soon as the
legislator recognizes, aside from the particular air law liability, the
liability of the droit commun, and does not limit the category of
persons to whom it can be applied, there is no reason, once the
fault of the owner is established, why the liability of the droit
commun could not be applied, particularly in the cases which do not
fall under the rule of special aeronautical liability.
Consequently, the particular rules for liability, instituted by
Article 59, line 1, only concern the cases where damage has been
caused by an aircraft accident; in all other cases the rules of the
civil law must be applied.
But what are these rules? Can the principles of Article 1384,
line 1, of the Code Napoleon, be applied to the aircraft owner,
i. e., the presumption of liability of the gardien, in allowing by
way of defense only force majeure and the fault of the injured
person? This rule is much more severe than that of the aero-
nautical law. If we permit its application, the result will be that,
in case of damage not caused by an accident, the injared person
will be favored more, i. e., precisely where he would least need
assistance. Because, when the injury occurs, not from a sudden
and unexpected happening (accident), but simply from the con-
tinual operation of an aircraft, such for example as frequent
flights over land at low altitude, it is evident that the person in-
jured would have no difficulty in proving the fault of the party
liable. It would then be not only useless but even unjust and
contrary to the purpose of the legislator to apply in this case any
more severe rules than those of the aeronautical law. If the leg-
islator has particularly regulated the liability of the aircraft owner,
it is purposely to avoid the application of the very severe rule
of Article 1384, line 1, at the same time granting to the injured
person the advantage of presumption of fault as created by the
aeronautical law. Thus, in addition to the presumption of fault,
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instituted by the law of March 14, 1928, there is no place for an-
other more severe presumption, based on the civil law.
Therefore, aside from the rules of the aeronautical law, Arti-
cles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code cannot be applied to the
liability of the aircraft owner. However, in case the injury has
been caused by his employee, he incurs liability in conformity with
Article 1384, line 3, of the Code Napoleon. In granting this, the
writer does not wish to incur objection by admitting the more
severe rule of the droit commun, aside from the presumption of the
aeronautical law. Article 1384, line 3, as Professors Henri and
Leon Mazeaud have so carefully shown, does not contain a rule
of presumption of fault of masters and employers:
The employee is only an instrument in their hands, of such kind that,
wheo, he acts, it is exactly as though the employer himself had acted . . .
the employee is no more than an extension of the employer; it would be
as absurd on the part of the employer to refuse to answer for the acts
of his employee as to refuse to answer for his own acts, as though he
believed that such an act were the work of his hand and not of his body. 2
Thus, in case the damage is not caused by an accident-for
example, if it is a question of depreciation of property or of nuis-
ance caused to a landowner by the noise of an aircraft motor, and
so forth-the person injured could bring no action based on the
particular air law liability, he could have recourse only to the civil
law, especially under Article 1382 and 1383 and would have to prove
fault of the party liable. Nevertheless, by application of Article
1384, line 3, proof of fault of the pilot or of any other employee
would be sufficient to hold the aircraft owner for payment of
damages.
The aeronautical law holds the aircraft owner liable for dam-
age caused by his apparatus. Nevertheless, he will be exempt: (1)
if he has leased the use of his aircraft to another person who op-
erates it to his own benefit, on condition that such lease be inscribed
in the national aircraft register; in this case, the latter person as-
sumes liability; (2) if the aircraft has been unlawfully used with-
out the consent of its owner; the unlawful possessor would be liable
in this case. However, if the unlawful operation of the aircraft
has not been made against the wishes of its owner, the latter and
the unlawful possessor would then be jointly liable.
At what moment does the liability of the aircraft owner begin
and end, as defined by the law of March 14, 1928? Article 58
states that the owner incurs liability for damage caused by the use
72. Op. cit., Vol. I, No. 857 et seq., and 935.
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of the aircraft. Then, liability is incurred for damage caused not
only by and during the flight of the aircraft, but even while it is on
the ground, provided that at that moment it is in operation. It is
not important to know whether the aircraft is in condition to fly
or not. It is sufficient that at the time it causes injury it be placed
under one of the forces necessary for its maintenance or operation
in the air. Thus, as soon as an aircraft is in such position that
motor power or wind can cause it to move, it will be deemed in
operation. For example, an aircraft is about to land; it stops, its
propeller stops turning, when suddenly a strong wind comes up
which causes a movement of the plane, injuring a person-the
particular liability of the aeronautical law will apply in this case.
In r~sumi, the law of March 14, 1928, instituted against the
aircraft owner less severe liability than that of the droit commun.
This does not hinder the protection of the interests of the injured
person by exempting him from the burden of proof.
United States of America
In considering the principles which regulate liability for dam-
age caused by aircraft on the surface, we must first look into the
very particular character of the legislation of this country.
The United States is a union of States. In certain domains,
exclusive authority has been granted by the Constitution to the
federal government, while in others the federal authority and that
of the particular States operate concurrently. Finally, in some
other domains, authority belongs exclusively to the particular States.
The writer would wander from the body of this article if he wished
to analyze the principle of the limitation of this power. He will
limit himself then to mentioning that Congress believes that it pos-
sesses sufficient power to regulate a great number of the problems
raised by aviation. Article 1, Section 8, clause 3 of the Constitu-
tion gives Congress the power to regulate commerce between the
different States.
The Air Commerce Act was promulgated in 1926.1 In Sec-
tion 3, this Act has given power to the Secretary of Commerce to
prescribe rules for regulating aviation. These rules, called Air
Commerce Regulations, have been duly published and entered into
force March 22, 1927. They include among others the rules for
air traffic, 74 fixing the minimum height at which aircraft can fly,
73. Complete title: "An Act to encourage the use of aircraft in commerce
and for other purposes."
74. Chapter V.
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and so forth-questions which indirectly interest us. But the
problem of liability is not even touched on. This is explained by
the principle on which is based the limitation of federal power and
those of each of the States. Actually, each State may regulate all
the problems within its boundary and the federal government may
not interfere, except in case difficulties arise in connection with
interstate commerce in air navigation.75 But, the problem of lia-
bility toward third persons has no relation to interstate commerce.
Also, in spite of the readily recognized necessity for making
uniform the principles of liability in adapting them to aviation, no
progress has been made in the creation of a federal law. In this
regard, the Committee on Aeronautical Law of the American Bar
Association drew up a text called the Uniform State Law of Aero-
nautics. This text only deals in general with problems arising from
the legal power of the States, and the subject of liability is not
mentioned either in the Air Commerce Act or in the Air Commerce
Regulations.
Section 5 of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics deals with
damage caused by aircraft to third parties on the surface and to the
liability which proceeds from it. Before analyzing its contents,
the writer wishes to mention that Section 5 of this Act has been
adopted by eighteen States and territories. 71 In 1931, the State of
Idaho repealed the application of this law and promulgated a dif-
ferent law in regard to aerial liability, identical with that of the
State of Pennsylvania. 77  Furthermore, the States of Arizona and
Connecticut adopted analogous laws, which differ from Section 5
of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics 7
Thus at the present time, eighteen States and territories apply
the principle of liability as established by the Uniform State Law
of Aeronautics; four States have adopted special and different laws;
the rest of the States apply the common law to damages caused by
aircraft.75
75. See Logan, George B., "The Interstate Commerce 'Burden Theory' Ap-
plied to Air Transportation," 1 JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 434 et seq.
"76. Delaware, 1923, Ch. 199, §5 ;Idaho, 1925, Ch. 92, §5; Indiana, 1927,
Ch. 43, §5 ; Maryland, 1927, Ch. 637 §5; Michigan, 1923, No. 224, §5; Min-
nesota, 1929, Ch. 219, §5; Nevada, 1923, Ch. 66, §5 ; New Jersey, 1929, Ch. 311
North Carolina, 1929, Ch. 190, §5; North Dakota, suppl. 1925. Ch. 2971, §5
Rhode Island, 1929, Ch. 1435, §5; South Carolina, 1929, No. 189, §5 ; South
Dakota, §L925. Ch. 6, §5; Tennessee, suppl. 1926, §L616, line 6 ; Utah, 1923,
Ch. 4, §5 ; Vermont. 1923, No. 155, §5; Wisconsin, 1929, Ch. 348 ; Hawaii,
1925, §3895.
77. 1929, Act. 317, sec. 6.
78. Arizona, 1929, Ch. 38, §11 ; Connecticut, 1929, Ch. 253, §32.
79. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 and the Air Commerce Regulations,
applicable to all States and territories, identically define "aircraft" as "any
contrivance now known or hereafter Invented, used or designed for navigation
of or flight in the air, except' a parachute or 'other contrivance designed for
such navigation but used primarily as safety equipment." The Uniform State
Law of Aeronautics gives a more exact definition, Including in the term aircraft
balloons, airplanes, hydroplanes and all other equipment used for air navigation.
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We next have to deal with special texts for aerial liability,
such as drawn up, either in the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics,
or in the four State legislations which will be mentioned. After-
wards we shall discuss the principles of the common law as ap-
plied in all the other States.
Section 5 introduces absolute liability for damage caused on the
surface. In the first place, this damage must be caused by the
take-off, landing, flight of the aircraft, or even by the falling of some
object from the aircraft. Under this law compensation can not be
secured for damage caused by an airplane rolling across the surface
of the ground. Thus, Section 5 can not be applied to damage
caused by an aircraft standing still on the ground, going into or
out of a hangar, or simply moving upon the ground. It would be
otherwise if the damage were caused by an aircraft rolling, with
its motor operating, over the ground to assume position for the
take-off, or rolling along the ground without any motor .power,
immediately after its landing. These transitional moments are
included in the terms "ascent" and "descent" mentioned in Sec-
tion 5, which otherwise would be meaningless, because while the
aircraft is in the air, whatever its altitude, it is evidently in flight.
Damage must cause an injury to persons or things on the
surface. Since Section 5 makes no discrimination on this point, it
follows that any damage whatsoever, if there be a causal relation
between it and the flight, take-off or landing of the aircraft, must
be fully compensated.
When the damage is caused by an aircraft under the condi-
tions mentioned, it is unnecessary to know what had been the
causes. Whether it be negligence of the pilot, act of a third per-
son, air risk, or force majeure, full liability will always be in-
curred."" Only one defense is valid, and that is in case the dam-
age is caused in whole or in part by the negligence (fault) of the
person injured, or by that of the owner or guardian of the object
injured. To show to what degree the negligence of the person
injured deprives him of compensation, we must turn to the com-
mon law, where application of this principle to aeronautics is
made many times. Thus, in case of air exhibitions, when spec-
tators were injured, the courts have generally granted them com-
pensation, in spite of the fact that they were seated very near
80. However, G. Anstreich and S. Kempner, in their note concerning Sec-
tion 5 of the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics, 4 Air Law Rev. 174, believe
that "Act of God" and force majeure, as causes of damage, completely exempt
from liability as instituted by Section 5. Nevertheless, these writers show no
proof to substantiate their thesis; their discussion proclaims absolute liability
and does not mention force majeure as cause for exemption.
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the point of take-off or landing of the aircraft-sometimes even in
cases when they had left the seat which had been assigned them.
Nevertheless, in some of these cases, negligence of the persons
injured could not be proved.8' For example, a youthful spectator
at an air meet, in spite of a barrier, walked over to a balloon at
the moment of its ascension and was carried into the air;8 2 in
another case, the victim, without any compulsion, approached the
propeller of an airplane which caught and killed him.83 In these
two cases the plaintiffs were refused compensation.
Section 5 states that absolute liability is generally incurred by
the aircraft owner. If the aircraft has been rented, the person
who has taken it for hire will be equally liable. The pilot who is
not also the owner of the aircraft will only incur liability in case
of fault-in conformity with the common law.
Such severe liability has aroused strong opposition. The ques-
tion has been raised whether Section 5 of the Uniform State Law
of Aeronautics was not unconstitutional, whether it does not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States84 in depriving the aircraft owner of the right of defense in
establishing absence of fault, or force majeure8 5
Furthermore, four States among those who adopted the Uni-
form State Law of Aeronautics have omitted Section 5. The
States of Montana and Missouri apply common law liability, while
the States of Pennsylvania and Arizona have promulgated, as has
been mentioned, special laws on the subject. Finally, the State
of Idaho in 1931 rejected Section 5 and adopted a law identical
with that of the State of Pennsylvania.
The law adopted by the States of Pennsylvania and Idaho
differs from Section 5 in that absolute liability has been replaced
by delictual liability. The aircraft owner is only liable for his
negligence, in conformity with the common law-with this one
difference, that it is always presumed that he has committed a
fault. This presumption can be opposed by proof of fault of the
person injured, by force ma;eure, by the fact that he had taken
81. Platt v. Erie Co. Agric. Soc., 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S. 520, 1928
U. S. Av. R. 116 (1914) Roper v. Ulster Co. Agric. Soc., 136 App. Div. 97,
120 N. Y. S. 644 (1909) Peckett v. Bergen Beach Co., 44 App. Div. 559, 60
N. Y. S. 966 (1899) ; Smith v. Cumnberland Co. Agric. Sec., 163 N. 0. 347, 79
S. E. 632, Ann. Cas. 1915B 644 (1913).
82. Bernier V. Woodstock Agric. Sec.. 88 Conn. 558, 98 Atl. 160, 1928
U. S. Av. R. 121 (1914).
83. Hough v. Curtiss Flying Service, Sup. Jud. Ct. Me., 1929 U. S. Av.
R. 99 (1929).
84. Section 1: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
85. Osterhout, Howard, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied
to Aviation," 2 Air Law Rev. 18.
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all necessary measures to avoid the injury, or, finally, that there
is no existent relation between the pilot and the aircraft owner
(for example, in the case of theft and unlawful operation of an
aircraft).
The laws on aerial liability promulgated by the States of
Arizona and Connecticut base liability on negligence. But it is
the pilot whom they make liable in the first place-while admitting
secondarily the liability of his employer. As previously stated, the
other States apply the principles of the common law to liability
toward third persons, i. e., liability for fault. This liability could
be incurred only in case the commission or omission of a fault onl
the part of the owner could be established.
The next question is to determine whether the burden of proof
of fault always falls on the plaintiff-the victim of the injury.
Generally, he will be made to show proof, which, however, is diffi-
cult for him-in view of the fact that a person on the ground will
scarcely know, for example, the cause of an accident which results
in an airplane crashing onto his house. Also, to assist the plain-
tiff, the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been applied for some time.
This rule consists in shifting the burden of proof: it holds against
the defendant a double presumption, that of his negligence, as
well as the fact that this presumed negligence was the cause of
the injury. In order to apply this rule, it is necessary: (1) that
the object (the aircraft) which caused the damage be under ex-
clusive control of the defendant or his employee; (2) that the act
causing the injury be of such nature that it can reasonably and at
first glance be explained by the negligence of the defendant. These
presumptions are not incontestable; the defendant can refute them
by showing proof, either that there was no fault on his part or
that of his employees, or that the injury was not caused through
his fault."6
Let us see now under what conditions the aircraft owner in-
curs liability and upon whom will fall the burden of proof. We
shall first consider those cases where damage was caused by the
dropping or the falling of objects, by the crash of an aircraft, or
by the take-off or landing of an aircraft, i. e., by an accident.
I. An accident is caused by the fault of the aircraft owner
or his employees. In this case, he definitely incurs liability. But
will the person injured be held to prove the fault of the person
86. See Logan, George B., "The Nature of the Right of Flight," 1 Air
Law Rev. 94; Harper, F. V., "Res Ipsa Loquitur in Air Law," 1 Air Law
Rev. 478; Osterhout. op. cit.; Schneider. J., "Negligence in the Law of Avia-
tion," 12 Boston U. Law Rev. 17 et seq.
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liable? In order to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is
necessary, as has been mentioned, "that the direct cause of the
accident, as well as the conditions which accompany it, be under
the control and charge of the defendant or his employees, in such
manner as not to seem unjust at first blush to attribute to them
liability for the damage."8 7  Thus this doctrine must be rejected
in all cases where, at first blush, the accident can be proved due
to causes other than the operation of the aircraft. The person
injured will then be held to prove fault on the part of the de-
fendant. In conformity with this principle, the rule of res ipsa
loquitur has been applied to two aviation cases, the second of
which has been greatly disputed. In the first case, the question
deals with the crash of a plane in the vicinity of an airport and
injury caused to a person on the surface. The injured person,
not being able to show the cause of the accident, simply invoked
the negligence of the pilot. At the first hearing, the court refused
to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur and the plaintiff's suit was
denied, since he had not shown proof of the fault of the defendant.
But this judgment was reversed on a rehearing for the reason
that, in such a case, the rule res ipsa loquitur should be applied. s8
In the second case, the plaintiff was driving an automobile on a
road near an aviation field, when a plane piloted by an employee of
the defendant ran into the automobile, causing damage, compensa-
tion for which was demanded in court. The plaintiff could only
prove the facts of the case as well as the injury he had sustained,
but he could not establish fault on the part of the pilot, nor even
explain the cause of the collision. He had to base his plea then
solely on the rule of res ipsa loquitur. Compensation was allowed
him by the court.89
II. The accident is caused neither through fault of the air-
craft owner nor through that of his employees. (A) First, we
will take the case where the fault of a third person causes the
accident. We can see two possible results; (1) an act or omission
of an act of a third person as direct cause of the accident; for
example, aircraft "A" collides in flight with aircraft "B," wherein
the latter falls on property and destroys a roof; (2) the defendant
purposely causes the accident (fall or sudden landing) to avoid
the result of a wrongful act of a third person; for example, the
87. Ellis v. Ellison, 1931 Mass. Adv. Sheets 911 (1931).
88. Seaman v. Curtiss FPling Service, Inc., 231 App. Div. (N. Y.) 867(1930). For the judgment of the Supreme Court, May 17, 1929, see 1929
1T. S. Av. R. 48; for the retrial decision of Mar. 10, 1931, see 1931 U. S. Av.
R. 229.
89. Sollak v. New York, 1929 U. S. Av. R. (N. Y. Ct. Cl., 1927).
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pilot lands on the square of a park to avoid collision with another
plane which is being handled improperly by its pilot. In these
two cases there certainly would be some party who would be liable
-specifically, the third person whose negligence was the initial
cause of the injury. The question is to know whether the owner
of the airplane in the accident also incurred liability. But Anglo-
American jurisprudence seems to prefer to exempt him in both
cases. It is true that there are no decisions dealing with this point
in the field of aviation law. But we can borrow from the field of
automobile law where there are many cases. For example, the
defendant's automobile, violently struck by another, has been
thrown into the path of a third party and causes injury. The
court does not hold any liability against the defendant °0 In an-
other case, the defendant's car, in order to avoid collision which
threatened it through the fault of another automobile, was vio-
lently thrown from the road and through this act caused injury
to a third party. Here also the defendant was declared not liable.9'
(B) Let us turn now to the case where damage is caused by
an accident which is not the result of the fault of the pilot nor
of a third person, nor of force majeure. It might be caused by
some occurrence generally ufforeseen by the air transport operator
in the present state of aeronautical science. Such would be, for
example, an imperfection in the motor or wing structure, which,
in spite of constant examination for defects, leaves much to be
desired; a new aeronautic phenomenon; an atmospheric condition
overtaking the pilot in the course of a flight, and so forth. This
might be, as M. Roger Prochasson 2 has stated, "a very special
aeronautic risk, of a very complex nature . . . presenting a
very limited character, since it brings together only certain clearly
characterized facts, not the result of a fault in the piloting." These
events which we shall call, in the words of M. Prochasson, "air
risks" (risques de l'air) can by themselves cause an aircraft ac-
cident that would result in damage to third persons. On the other
hand, an aviator, in an effort to avoid such damage, can commit
an act which also causes injury (for example, landing on the roof
of a house, and so forth).
Because of the lack of decisions dealing with this problem in
the field of aviation, the writer is forced to refer to jurisprudence
in a different field, where it is shown that the aviator should be
held liable and the rule res ipsa loquitur can be applied.
90. Woods v. Greathead. 151 L. T. 10 (Eng. 1921).
91. Fleming v. Hartrick. 100 W. Va. 714, 131 S. E. 558 (1926).
92. Le Risque de i'Air (Paris. 1931).
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(C) If the accident is due to force majeure, the aircraft
owner will evidently be exempt from all liability. The injured
person alone must bear the injury which he has suffered.
We must now view the cases where the injury is not caused
by an accident, but by the normal operation of aircraft. Flight
over land or rural property can cause nuisance or annoyance to
its owner. 'In these cases, jurisprudence refuses any action to the
injured owner when the flight is made in a normal manner at a
reasonable heightf 3 The conclusions would be different if the
flights, for any reasons whatever, were made too often or at too
low an altitude-for example, in the neighborhood of an airport
or an air school.9 4  But normal flight can cause more tangible
damage, for example, in frightening animals which are on the
surface beneath. Such fear can either do injury to the animals
or even, in injuring them, make them dangerous to persons. In
the first case, jurisprudence is divided. Under similar conditions,
compensation has sometimes been refused, 5 and other times
granted.96 In the second case, where animals take fright at the
sight of an airplane and cause injury to persons, jurisprudence
grants to the injured persons the right to claim compensation of
the aviator.- Evidently in all these cases the rule of res ipsa
loquitur could not be applied.
Let us now review rapidly the manner of application of the
common law to compensation for damage caused by aircraft on
the surface of the earth. We have only to discuss a very special
case, where a boat on the water would be damaged by the fall of
a plane or of objects dropping or having been thrown from it.
Admiralty law would then apply. In this case, the essential differ-
ence between common law and admiralty law is that in case of
concurrent fault by aircraft owner and the person injured, the
injury and the compensation would be, according to maritime law,
93. Smith V. New England Aircraft Co., Inc., Worcester Airport, Inc.,
1929 U. S. Av. R. 27 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1928).
94. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6),
decided Dec. 30, 1931; Rush Hospital, Gay et al v. Sky Haven Airport, de-
cided Sept. 8, 1932, by the Chester County Court of Common Pleas in Penn.,
cited by Logan, George B., in 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 468.
95. For example, in the case where a military airplane in flying over a
field frightened a beast which in running struck a fence and injured itself
(Decision of U. S. Comp., 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 46, 1923) ; or
in the case. where flight over a farm for raising silver foxes frightened these
animals, some of whom died of fright and others were made sick (Nebraska
Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., U. S. D. C. Neb., Feb. 24,
1531. commented on In 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 669).
96. For example, some hens frightened by the flight of an airplane
stopped laying (Glatt v. Page, Dist. Ct., 3d Jud. Dist. Neb., 1928, cited in 3
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 331).
97. For example, a team of horses taking fright because an airship flew
over them rushed off and injured the plaintiff (Ne4swonger v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (1929)).
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divided between the two, whereas, in conformity with common
law, the fault of the injured person would deprive him in general
of any right to full compensation. It is true that this latter rule
sometimes allows an exception, where it might happen that the
aircraft owner would be adjudged to pay partial or full com-
pensation.
In summing up the principles applied in the United Sattes to
aerial liability toward third persons, we see that an attempt has
been made to incorporate the principle of absolute liability. This
tendency, strong five years ago, is already beginning to weaken.
The number of States which have adopted it not only do not grow
but are beginning to diminish. The doctrine is returning to the
liability of the common law s' and the question is even raised as to
whether the application of absolute liability is permissible or con-
stitutional.
Examination of All Other Aeronautic Legislation.
Bulgaria
Aviation is regulated by the law of July 23, 1925, of which
Article 22 institutes absolute liability of the aircraft owner for
damage caused by the operation of his aircraft. In case the air-
craft has been used without his consent, the owner is exempt from
all liability, which in turn falls entirely upon him who has un-
lawfully profited by the use of the aircraft.
In case the aircraft belongs to a private aviation interest, the
law 09 requires payment of a deposit to serve as guaranty for pay-
ment of any compensation incurred. In case the aviation company
does not pay compensation, that amount will be deducted from
the deposit. The deposit can only be returned to the company four
months after its settlement.
Chile
Aviation is regulated by a decree having the power of a law,
of May 15, 1931. Article 1, specifying what is meant by the term
"aircraft," is identical with Article 1 of the French law of May 31,
1924. This has previously been explained in the chapter dealing
with French legislation.
98. See, for example, the article by Kingsley. Robert, t Gatea, Sam F.,




Article 52 institutes absolute liability for all damage caused on
the surface, the owner or lessee of the aircraft, the operator and
the person causing the injury being jointly liable.
Denmark
The law of May 1, 1923, regulating aeronautics, includes with-
in the meaning of "aircraft": airplanes (land and sea), airships,
and free balloons. Thus gliders captive balloons, kites and para-
chutes are not regulated by the aeronautical law. 10 This law in-
stitutes absolute liability for damage caused to third persons, which
liability can be avoided only by. proof of fault of the person in-
jured. 10 ' It is interesting to note that the Danish law' 02 makes
the owner or possessor of the aircraft liable for damage caused,
among others, by persons attracted to the aircraft when it lands or
crashes outside the airport. Absolute liability instituted by Article
36 of the law of May 1, 1923, will not be applied in case the acci-
dent happens within the airport. In that case the droit commnun
is applied,'i. e., liability based on the idea of fault.10 3
The aircraft owner is required to contract for insurance to
cover possible damages. The Minister can authorize the owner to
make a money deposit instead of insurance104
Finland
The law of May 25, 1923, regulating air navigation, gives in
Article 2, line 2, the same definition for aircraft as the Danish law.
Article 6 institutes absolute liability, but only on the part of the
aircraft owner, excluding the pilot.
Hungary
The Order of the President of the Council of Ministers, of
December 30, 1922, regulating air navigation, institutes absolute
liability of the owner and pilot of the aircraft. They will be ex-
empt from liability if the accident causing the injury has been
caused by the person injured. In case injury resulted from the
use of the aircraft without the knowledge of the owner or pilot,
only the person profiting by its use will be held liable.'0 5
100. Article 1.
101. Article 36, lines 1 and 2.
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Mexico
Air navigation is regulated by rules contained in the law on
General Communication Lines and Means of Transport, of August
31, 1931.106 Book 4 of this extensive code is devoted to air trans-
port. Article 443 defines the term "aircraft." They are machines
capable of flight by sustaining themselves in a static or dynamic
manner in the air, and designed for the transport of persons and
things. Consequently parachutes are not included in the category
of aircraft.
Liability toward third persons is regulated by Chapter IX of
Book 4 of the law. Article 498 institutes liability of the aircraft
owner for all damage which he had caused to persons or things.
However, Article 500 exempts the owner from liability for dam-
age, if it has been caused by chance, by force majeure, or in the
course of a flight which had been authorized by the authorities.
Finally, Article 501 exempts the owner and crew of the aircraft
from their liability for damage caused by accidents to persons, if
they had taken all reasonable and technical measures to avoid the
damage.
We see then that the Mexican legislator instituted delictual
liability, with presumption of fault of the aircraft owner, which
he can always contest by proof of force majeure or chance, and,
in certain cases, by proof that he committed no fault. Thus the
procedure of the Mexican law is analogous to that of the Polish
law. However, it contains an important difference. In particular,
the Polish air law, as we have seen, defines the fault of the air-
craft owner as neglect to take necessary safety measures to avoid
the accident, while the Mexican law is more exacting in substitut-
ing the idea of "damage" for that of "accident." It follows that
any damage caused other than by accident does not come under
the aviation law in Poland but falls under the jurisdiction of the
droit commun, which is not the case in Mexico. However, proof
of absence of fault, i. e., that measures had been taken to avoid the
injury, will not be admitted in Mexico except in case of damage
caused to persons by an accident.
Thus, in case an airplane by flight at a low altitude frightens
animals and causes damage to the landowner below, the Polish law
of aviation will not be applied, and liability will be maintained
under the jurisdiction of the droit commun, which is much more
favorable to the aircraft owner. In Mexico, it will be different-
106. Ley sobre vlas generales de comunication y medlos de transporte.
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air navigation regulations will apply. There would then be pre-
sumption of liability against the aircraft owner, and, since in this
case the question is not one of damage caused to persons by the
existence of an accident, his exemption would lie only in proof
of accident by chance, force majeure or a flight which had been
authorized by authorities.
It appears that the Mexican law, although based on the same
principle as the Polish law, is more severe.
The person who operates an aircraft without the consent and
knowledge of its owner incurs liability instead of the latter.10 7
The owner incurs liability jointly with the person to whom he has
leased his aircraft for commercial service, unless the competent
authorities are duly notified of this lease.
Norway
The law of December 7, 1923, regulating air navigation, ap-
plies the same definition in Article 1 for aircraft as the Danish law.
Article 37 institutes absolute liability for the aircraft owner, from
which he can be exempt only by proof of grave fault of the injured
person. The Norwegian law has no regulations concerning dam-
age caused by persons attracted by the crash of an airplane.'0 1
But the Supreme Court of Norway, in deciding such a case, re-
tained the liability of the aircraft owner. In its report, the Court
mentioned that the crash of an aircraft is an extraordinary occur-
rence, likely to draw curiosity, and that the gathering of a crowd
and the injuries which it caused on the land of the plaintiff con-
stituted the natural result of an aviation accident. It follows that
there would be a sufficient causal relation between the damage
caused by the assembled crowd and that caused by the crash of the
aircraft.109
Nevertheless, absolute liability as instituted by Article 37 is
not applied to damage caused within the limits of an airport. As
in Denmark, the droit commun would then be applied, i. e., lia-
bility for fault. 10  I
Aircraft owners can be forced by competent authority to con-
tract insurance to cover possible future damages.
107. Article 498.
108. See Denmark.
109. Fredrikstad Forenede Tegiverlcer v. Karl Borch, Axel Johanson & C.
Paulsen. decided Oct. 5. 1921. by the Court of Tune, confirmed by the Court
of Appeal, Christiania (Norsk Retstidende 1925), and by the Supreme Court
of Norway, June 23. 1925.
110. Article 98.
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Salvador
Air navigation is regulated by the Decree of May 17, 1923.
This law does not define the meaning of aircraft, but, inasmuch
as Salvador ratified in June, 1932, the Ibero-American Convention
of November 1, 1925, of which Annex D gives a 4efinition of air-
craft, there must be included in this definition all captive or free
balloons kites, airships and airplanes.
Article 5 of the Decree of May 17, 1923, institutes absolute
-liability of the aircraft owner for all damage caused to property
of another through any accident or lack of care.
Siam
Air navigation is regulated by the law B. E. 2465 of 1922,
modified by Amendment B1, E. 2467 of 1924, and the Act of
Amendment B. E. 2468 of 1925.
The law does not give any definition of the word "aircraft,"
but since Siam ratified on February 2, 1920, the Convention of
Paris of October 13, 1919, which, in Annex D, clearly points out
what is included in this term, it follows that the Siamese law in-
cludes within its* definition of aircraft captive and free balloons,
kites, airships and airplanes.
Liability toward third persons is regulated in a very compli-
cated manner. According to the case in question, there would be
absolute liability, delictual liability or presumed liability. In this
regard, the Siamese law is similar to the Italian law, but, when it
is a question of application of each of these forms of liability, the
Siamese law is contrary to the Italian law.
Absolute liability will be incurred for all damage caused to
persons and things in case of landing outside an airport or other
locality specially designed for the landing of aircraft."' The ques-
tion is whether this rule can be understood in a restrictive sense
or whether the word "landing" (aterrissage) can be used in a
broader sense and include also the crash (chute) of an aircraft.
In view of the lack of jurisprudence and doctrine, it is difficult
to determine whether the word "land" can also include in Siam
the meaning of "crash." Nevertheless, the wording of line 2,
§117, leads the writer to prefer the broader interpretation of this
text. The said text specifies that liability will be incurred even in
case the landing took place as a result of force majeure. It is not
the intent of this regulation to inflict punishment by fine on the
111. Section 117. line 2.
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aircraft owner for having landed outside the regular locality, but
it is instituted solely to protect adequately. third persons injured
on the surface of the earth. But what is the difference to the
person injured as to whether this be a forced landing or an air-
plane crash, at the time he is injured? It is equally difficult for
him to avoid both. This seems even more reasonable if we com-
pare line 2 of §117 with line 1 of the same section. which only
institutes presumption of fault against the aircraft owner, who
causes damage in landing at an authorized airport or any other
place specially designed for air traffic. It is clear that third per-
sons who are at an airport are less exposed to danger than those
who are outside, because, knowing that aircraft are flying over,
taking-off and landing at an airport, they must and do protect them-
selves and their property, and, furthermore, thanks to the as-
sistance of the airport personnel and to the special air traffic or-
ganization, they are well protected. If an accident happens to
them, it is generally because they do not conform to the rules and
regulations of the air transport companies and the airport officials.
Nevertheless, the persons injured by aircraft at airports enjoy
special protection, because there is not only a presumption of lia-
bility against the aircraft owner, but also the law does not allow
him to shox(, proof of lack of fault. He will be excused only
through force majeure or through the fault of the airport officials.
Although the law does not mention it, the fault of the person in-
jured-in case it was the actual cause of the injury-exempts the
aircraft owner from liability in the two cases provided for by §117.
Liability for objects dropping or falling from an aircraft in
the air is regulated on a basis much more favorable to the aircraft
operator.I12 He will be exempt from all liability for damage caused
by the dropping of ballast (fine sand or water), newspapers (in
conformity with authorization from the appropriate minister) and
the dropping of any other articles as authorized by the competent
authorities, 113 on condition that such care be taken as would be
taken by an ordinarily prudent person. The aircraft owner is
liable for the dropping or falling of any other object, only in
case there was any negligence on his part."14 Thus the person
injured will be obliged to show proof of fault of the liable party,
in conformity with the droit commun. In all these cases liability
is incurred, as has been indicated, by the aircraft owner. In addi-
tion, the passenger will be liable for damage caused by the falling
112. Section 115, line 2.
113. Section 12.
114. Section 115, line 1.
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of objects, in case the dropping of objects (fallen or thrown) is
done by them with malicious intent, purposely or negligently, 11
and where any other damage is caused either by their fault or by
non-observance of the rules which have been posted or duly made
known to travelers.
The rules regulating liability in Siam are quite complicated,
but are reasonable. Where the landowners are in greatest danger
from aircraft and where it is impossible for them to take safety
measures, they are quite sufficiently protected by the law which
institutes, on their behalf, absolute liability on the part of the air-
craft owner. In regard to damage caused at the airport, the danger
is much less and it is possible for third persons to take safety meas-
ures. Also the legislator is less severe in that regard, in adopting
other rules more favorable to the persons injured than those of
the droit commun, i. e., instituting a presumption of liability against
the aircraft owner. As for the dropping of objects, either thrown
or fallen, these cases are rare and the damage caused is slight; it
is much easier to prove fault of the party liable, because technical
questions can not enter into the proceedings. Also the legislator
has maintained the liability of the droit commun.
We must still indicate the care which the Siamese legislator
has taken in drawing up the aeronautical law. Seciion 118 deals
with absolute liability of the aircraft owner for damage caused on
the surface by persons who have been attracted to an aircraft ac-
cident, without distinguishing whether they came of their own
accord or were called by some of the personnel of the aircraft.
Of all aviation legislation, only that of Denmark and Siam have
dealt with this case, which in other countries has been much dis-
cussed in jurisprudence.116
Sweden
The definition of aircraft is given in Article 1 of the law of
April 20, 1928. Aircraft are stated to be airplanes, airships and
free balloons.
Aerial liability as regulated by the law of May 26, 1922, is
absolute liability, and only the fault of the person injured is able
to exempt from or lessen the amount of compensation."'
115. Section 116.
116. For example, in Germany the case decided in 1890 In Frankfort,
cited by Zitelrnann, Luftschiffahrtrecht (Leipzig, 1910). v. 37: in the United
States. qGuille v. Swan, 19 John 381, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 53 (1822); in Great
Britain, Scott's Trustees v. Moss (1889) in France the case decided Jan. 24,
1906, by the Tribunal of the Seine, cited by Basilesco, La Propri6tc de l'Espace
A6rien (Paris, 1920), p. 189: in Norway, the case decided by the Supreme
Court, June 6, 1925, cited in the chapter dealing with Norwegian legislation.
117. Article 1.
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Liability is incurred by the aircraft owner 1 8 and by the pos-
sessor jointly."19 However, the person who uses an aircraft for a
flight without having permission from its owner, must assume lia-
bility instead of the owner for all damage caused by said flight.Y0
Switzerland
Liability for damage caused by aircraft on the surface of the
earth is regulated by the Decree of the Federal Council of Janu-
ary 27, 1920, concerning regulation of air navigation in Switzer-
land.
The law does not explain what is meant by the expression
"aircraft." M. Hess, relying on former aerial regulation and on
the principles of the present law, believes that the word aircraft
means airships, airplanes, free or captive balloons, gliders, kites
and parachutes."'
Article 26 of the Decree institutes absolute liability. The
party liable can exempt himself neither by proof of force majeure
nor by that of fault of a third person. Even the fault of the
person injured can not necessarily take from the latter the right
to compensation, Article 26 actually mentioning that "the judge
can grant full or partial exemption from civil liability in case of
fault of the injured person." But it is not absolute, for the
legislator relies entirely on the discretion of the judge. Also, the
injured person, to secure compensation, has only to show proof of
injury which he has suffered by the actual operation of the aircraft.
The law does not explain what is meant by operation (ex-
ploitation), which is generally interpreted in the same manner as
has been shown in the sections devoted to the Austrian and Ger-
man legislation. Relative to causal relation, the Swiss doctrine is
based on the theory of adequate causality. Article 26 maintains
liability for all damage, even if indirect. Thus, damage caused
by horses frightened by the sound of an aircraft motor" 2 would
be subject to compensation. The aeronautical law does not de-
termine the amount of compensation; this must be determined by
the law of obligations. Article 43 of the law of obligations allows
the judge complete freedom to determine, according to the cir-
cumstances, the amount of compensation. Besides compensation




121. Schweizerlches Luftrecht (Zurich, 1927), pp. 10 & 20.
122. See Kilkowski, op. cit., p. 17.
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of obligations to allow fair compensation to the injured person in
case of bodily injury, or to his dependents in case of death.
The same liability is instituted for the dropping of objects. 123
Liability is incurred: (1) by the person in whose name permission
to fly is granted, (2) by the possessor of the aircraft, i. e., by the
aircraft operator, and, obviously, (3) by the person who causes
the injury. All these persons are jointly, liable. The persons
obliged to pay compensation, in conformity with Article 26, have
the right to seek redress against the person whose fault has caused
the injury.
This very severe liability is applied not only to private aircraft
but also to those belonging to the state.1 24
The Swiss legislator, who wishes to assure persons injured
by aircraft the possibility of obtaining full compensation under
the most favorable conditions, is not bound to institute absolute
and unlimited liability, but he is obliged to assure them receipt of
compensation. Thus, the competent authority has the right to
demand the deposit of a guaranty by the owner or possessor of
the aircraft, before the delivery of a navigation permit or cer-
tificate of registration of the aircraft. In conformity with Article
28, this guaranty can consist either of: (1) deposit of money,
(2) joint guaranty with a Swiss bank, or (3) liability insurance
contracted with a Swiss insurance company.
At the time of the promulgation of the Decree of January 27,
1920, the legislator was of the belief that insurance would be the
normal means of guaranty, while the money deposit and a bank
guaranty would serve temporarily-so long as the insurance com-
panies lacked statistical information and experience in this field.
It is interesting to note that only insurance and the bank guaranty
have been utilized and that a money deposit has never been em-
ployed.1 25  The guaranty thus determined must completely cover
the liability as defined by Article 26; furthermore, it must operate
in all cases without distinction-even if the aircraft is in the hands
of an incompetent pilot who does not possess the required authority.
Although the law only instituted an optional guaranty, leaving
to the competent authority the right to exact it or not, nevertheless,
in practice it is always requested.. The minimum requirement is
15,000 Swiss francs which must be reimbursed as soon as used in
payment of indemnity.126 In regard to insurance, we must note
123. Article 22 of the Decree.
124. Article 30.
125. Hess, op. cit., p. 67.
126. Ibid.
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that in conformity with Article 60 of the insurance law of April 2,
1908, the injured person has a right to a guaranty of an insurance
sum and the insured party is authorized to pay compensation di-
rect to the injured person.
The Swiss legislator has instituted a supplementary guaranty
for the benefit of the landowner who has the right to hold any
aircraft which has caused damage to his property.12 7.
We see then that the Swiss legislator in regulating aerial lia-
bility, has had in mind only the interests of the injured persons
and has very adequately protected them, but has completely failed
to recognize the interests of the aviators.
Czechoslovakia
Aerial navigation is regulated by the law of July 8, 1925, Sec-
tion 6 of which defines aircraft as free or captive balloons, motor
balloons, kites, airships and airplanes (land planes, hydroplanes,
helicopters, etc.).12 1 There is no doubt that parachutes are not
included in the law, but there is doubt as to whether gliders fall
under the jurisdiction of the aeronautical law.
Section 29 institutes liability for damage caused by the opera-
tion of aircraft. The law only allows two exemptions, in par-
ticular, fault of the injured person or that of a third person. No
member of the crew or other employee of the transport company
is considered as a third person, nor the owner or employee of any
organization in the service of air navigation, nor a participant in
the flight.
1 20
Thus the fault of a third person seems, in regard to the party
liable, more like force majeure. The Czechoslovakian law institutes
presumption of liability for fault1 30 which can only be opposed by
proof of fault of the injured party or a third person.
Liability is incurred by the possessor and commanding officer
of the aircraft. The aircraft owner will be liable if there is no
other possessor. The person who has unlawfully taken the aircraft
from its possessor or owner, incurs liability in their stead. Never-
theless these latter will not be exempt from liability, if the taking
of the aircraft has been made possible through their fault.
To insure to the injured person compensation which would be
due him, the Czechoslovakian law demands that the aircraft pos-
127. Article 29 of the Decree.
128. See Mandl, Vladimir, Leteck6 PrAvo (Pilsen, 1928).
129. Section 31.
130. See Diwald, "Das Tchechoslovakische Gesetz tiber den Luftverkehr,"
4 Zeitschrlft ftir Ostrecht 498 et seq. (1928).
NATION AVIATION LAW NATURE OF LIABILITY DEFENSES
Austria Law of Dec. 10, Presumption of liability 1. Fault of victim
1919; Ordinance of 2. Fault of third person
the Minister, Sept. 3. Force majeure
23, 1925
Bulgaria Law of July 23, 1925 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Chile Decree of May 15, Absolute liability Fault of the victim
1931
Denmark Law of May 1, 1923 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Finland Law of May 25, 1923 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
France Law of May 31, 1924 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Germany Law of Aug. 1, 1922; Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Ordinance of July 19,
1930
Great Britain Air Navigation Act, Presumption of fault Fault of the victim and
1920 all excuses of the droit
commuta
Hungary Ordinance of Dec. 30, Absolute liability Fault of the victim
1.922
Italy Decree-Law of Aug. Absolute liability for ob- Fault of the victim
20, 1923 jects thrown from plane
Presumption of f a u I t Fault of the victim and
for objects falling from force majeure
plane
Droit commun for take- All excuses of the droit
off, landing and fall of commun
plane
Mexico L a w on G e n e r a I Presumption of fault Unforeseen event or force
Means of Communica- majeure
ti o n s an d Transit, Authorized flight
Aug. 31, 1931 All reasonable measures
taken to avoid injury
Norway Law of Dec. 7. 1923 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Poland Decree of Mar. 14, Presumption of fault Fault of the victim
1928 Force majeure
All possible measures
taken to avoid injury
Salvador Decree of May 17, Absolute liability Fault of the victim
1923
Siam Law B. E. 2465 Absolute liability f o r Fault of the victim(1922) landing or crash outside
airport
Presumption of fault if Fault of the victim
accident happened at Fault of airport officials
port Force majeure
Droit commun for drop- Plaintiff must prove fault
ping or falling objects
Sweden Law of May 26, 1922 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
Switzerland Decree of Jan. 27, Absolute liability Fault of the victim
1920
Czecho-Slovakia Law of July 8, 1925 Presumption of fault Fault of the victim
Fault of third person
U. S. A. Uniform State Law Absolute liability Fault of the victim(17 states) of Aeronautics, 1923-
1929
U. S. S. I. Air Code of Apr. 27, Absolute liability Fault of the victim
1932
Jugoslavia Law of Feb. 22. 1928 Absolute liability Fault of the victim
CAUSE OF INJURY TO COMPENSA-
RECEIVE COMPENSATION TION LIMIT PERSONS LIABLE GUARANTEES
Operation of motor-driven None 1. Aircraft owner Insurance
aircraft 2. Non-professional crew Money deposit
3. Unlawful possessor Security deposit
Use of aircraft None 1. Aircraft owner Security deposit
2. Unlawful possessor
Aircraft None 1. Owner or lessee of None
plane
2. Commanding officer of
aircraft
3. Person causing injury
Use of aircraft outside None 1. Possessor Insurance
authorized airport 2. Employee of owner Money deposit
Aircraft None Aircraft owner None
Aircraft evolutions, or objects None Aircraft operator None
falling or dropping Aircraft lessee
Accident during aircraft 75,000 Rm. 1. Aircraft possessor Insurance
operation per accident 2. Unlawful user Security deposit
Flight, landing or take-off; None 1. Aircraft owner None
falling of objects from plane 2. Lessee for at least 14
days
Accident caused by aircraft None 1. Aircraft owner None
2. Pilot
3. Unlawful possessor
Dropping of objects 1. Aircraft owner
Falling objects R e 1 inauish- 2 Aircraft operator
ment of plane
if there had None
Crash. din o . been no fault
rr an ng or take-f of owner 3. Person causing injuryaircraft e
Aircraft None 1. Aircraft owner None
2. Unlawful possessor
Use of aircraft outside None Aircraft owner Competent au-
authorized airport thority can de-
mand contract
of insurance
Use of aircraft (accidents) None 1. Aircraft owner None
2. Lessee as registered in
Registration Records
3. Unlawful possessor
4. Persons causing injury
Accident caused by aircraft None Aircraft possessor None
Landing or crash of aircraft
outside airdrome 1. Aircraft owner
Landing or crash of aircraft None 2. Passengers If at fault None
within airdrome or if they violate the
regulations
Dropping or falling of objects
Use of aircraft None 1. Aircraft owner None
2. Aircraft possessor
3. Unlawful possessor
Aircraft and its use; dropping None 1. Person in whose name Insurance
of objects though authorized navigation permit is Money deposit
registered Bank guaranty
2. Aircraft possessor
3. Person causing injury
Aircraft operation None 1. Aircraft possessor Insurance
2. Aircraft owner Money deposit
3. Unlawful possessor Security deposit
4. Commanding officer of Bank guaranty
aircraft
Take-off, landing and flight of None 1. Aircraft owner None
aircraft; dropping or falling 2. Lessee
of objects 3. Pilot in case of fault
Aircraft None 1. Aircraft possessor None2. Aircraft operator
Evolution of the aircraft; ob- None 1 Aircraft owner and Nonejects falling from aircraft 2. Short time lessee or
3. Long time lessee
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sessor insure his risks, either by making a money or security
deposit or by furnishing a bank guaranty. The injured person
will then have a right to either the insurance sum or the guaranty.
U.S.S.R.
The air code of April 27, 1932, in Article 6, defines an aircraft
as an apparatus capable of circulating in th e air, which is either
heavier- or lighter-than-air. Parachutes, kites and captive balloons
would not be included as aircraft.
Article 53 institutes absolute liability for damage caused to
persons and to property. The only exemption will be grave fault
of the injured person. Liability falls jointly on the aircraft owner
and its operator.1 "
Jugoslavia
Air navigation is regulated by the law of February 22, 1928,
Article 1 of which qualifies aircraft as airplanes, hydroplanes,
helicopters, free and captive balloons, kites and airships. This
restrictive enumeration makes the aeronautic law inapplicable not
only to parachutes and gliders, but also to autogiros.
Article 88 institutes absolute liability for damage caused by
the operation of an aircraft, as well as by objects which fall from
it. Liability can be lessened or avoided if it is proved that the
injured party himself has contributed to the injury.
Generally, liability is incurred by the aircraft owner. How-
ever, in conformity with Article 89 in case of a temporary lease
(of short duration), the owner and the lessee incur joint liability.
In case of a long lease, the aircraft owner is liable only if it is
shown that there has been fault on his part.
(To be continued)
131. Article 57.
